This case has been cited 13 times or more.
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2015-08-12 |
JARDELEZA, J. |
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| As can be gleaned from the SEC's Order, the calling of the meeting for the conduct of an election was made to rectify the inadvertent approval of the two (2) year term for the members of the board. With the return of the one (1) year term, there is no more actual controversy that warrants the exercise of our judicial power. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.[71] | |||||
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2013-09-24 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations in private respondents' petition, remain highly-speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[47] This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar. | |||||
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2012-04-18 |
SERENO, J. |
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| The Constitution provides that judicial power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."[43] The exercise of judicial power requires an actual case calling for it. The courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions, or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests.[44] Furthermore, courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.[45] As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist.[46] An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution, as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.[47] There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.[48] | |||||
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2009-06-16 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.[8] Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration.[9] In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[10] An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.[11] | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[59] For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,[60] and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.[61] He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.[62] | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.[6] | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.[6] | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato[8] and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.[9] Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.[10] | |||||
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2008-10-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela[21] and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat[22] and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,[23] Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention. | |||||
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2007-12-14 |
TINGA, J, |
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| Undaunted, Araneta interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, on 30 May 1997, affirmed the lower court's decision.[19] In so holding, the appellate court declared that the title of Araneta to the disputed land is a nullity. It noted that Dimson's TCT No. R-15169 was derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917" and that the same was obtained by Dimson simultaneously with other titles, viz: TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, and 15168 by virtue of the Decision dated October 13, 1977 and Order dated October 18, 1977, in Special Proceedings No. C-732. It was also pointed out that Araneta's TCT No. 13574 and 21343 were both derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917" which was previously "declared null and void by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals."[20] | |||||
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2006-03-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and cases that have become moot.[3] The Constitution is quite explicit on this matter.[4] It provides that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, courts, through the power of judicial review, are to entertain only real disputes between conflicting parties through the application of law. For the courts to exercise the power of judicial review, the following must be extant (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the standing.[5] An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.[6] There must be a contrariety of legal | |||||
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2006-02-22 |
PANGANIBAN, CJ |
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| The decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character.[48] It is the prosecution that could essentially determine the strength of pursuing a case against an accused. The prosecutorial powers include the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange for testimony against another. Thus, Mapa v. Sandiganbayan[49] explained:"The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute."[50] | |||||
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2005-10-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The situation is different in cases when an accused is retained in the information but his discharge as state witness is sought thereafter by the prosecution before it rests its case, in which event, the procedural (in addition to the substantive) requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 apply. Otherwise stated, when no amendment to the information is involved as a by-product of reinvestigation and trial proceeds thereafter, the discharge of the accused falls squarely and solely within the ambit of Section 17, Rule 119. It is fitting then to re-state the rule in Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[33] that :. . . [T]he decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character. Only when an information, charging two or more persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in court will Rule 119, Section 9[34] of the Rules of Court, come into play. . . . | |||||