This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2008-04-09 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| The argument is specious. An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. Verily, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Thus, to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not violated, the information should state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed.[27] Further, it must embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.[28] | |||||
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2007-03-30 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused may be held liable for the acts of his co-accused. In the absence of any averment of conspiracy in the information, an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is individual and not collective.[33] | |||||
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2005-11-30 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| As to the sixth issue, the penalty imposed by the RTC is wrong. Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua when the amount malversed is greater than P22,000. Since appellant committed a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period, pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. In this case the penalty imposed should be reclusion perpetua. Since the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to indivisible penalties,[35] and reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty,[36] the Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be applied to the penalty in Criminal Cases Nos. 111086 and 111087. | |||||
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2004-07-06 |
TINGA, J, |
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| The information filed against an accused is intended to inform him of the accusations against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. It is thus textbook doctrine that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.[31] To ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is not violated, the information must state the name of the accused, the designation given to the offense by the statute, a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense, and the place where the offense has been committed.[32] It must embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.[33] | |||||
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2002-08-22 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.[9] In the case at bar, the Solicitor General noted that about an hour before the stabbing, the victim and appellant had an altercation which led the former to box the latter in his face. Appellant's anger must have placed the victim on guard against possible retaliation from appellant. Appellant retaliated by stabbing the victim when he chanced upon the latter sitting alone by the roadside. In our view, treachery cannot be appreciated in this case where appellant could have stabbed the victim by way of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the will,[10] even though the victim was stabbed from behind. Moreover, the victim was already aware of appellant's hostile attitude towards him even before the attack, hence, he was already forewarned of impending danger to his life.[11] The rule that a sudden attack by the assailant constitutes treachery, whether frontally or from behind, does not apply where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was first triggered evidently by a sudden anger of the accused.[12] Since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proved, in our view, the crime committed by appellant is not murder but only homicide. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the applicable penalty for homicide is only reclusion temporal. As there is neither | |||||
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2002-06-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As the evidence now stands, we are left to surmise whether Norberto Loreno or appellant Leysa fired the bullet that caused the death of the victim, Igmedio Larupay. Unfortunately, nothing on record could help us ascertain who of the two is legally responsible for Larupay's death. For while in theory, conspiracy could tie both men to the crime, we find that the trial court's finding of conspiracy is not supported by the evidence on record. Conspiracy must be proved. It cannot be surmised that conspiracy existed just because Norberto Loreno and appellant Leysa were both seen raising their arms and aiming at the victim. Conspiracy as a basis for conviction of appellant should be proved in the same manner as the criminal act.[21] Although direct proof is not essential,[22] conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly as the commission of the offense itself. It is a fundamental rule that a charge of conspiracy must be proven, just like any other criminal accusation, "independently and beyond reasonable doubt." [23] Mere simultaneous aiming by appellant and his co-accused at the victim with their firearms does not by itself demonstrate concurrence of will or unity of action or purpose that could be a basis for their collective responsibility.[24] | |||||
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2000-03-09 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Citing People v. Victor,[36] the solicitor general argues that the civil indemnity should be raised from P50,000 to P75,000. This is erroneous. In the said case, the Court held that "starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00." Obviously, that ruling, which involved rape and imposed the death penalty, cannot apply to the present case. Hence, consistent with current jurisprudence,[37] we affirm the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto. | |||||