This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2007-04-03 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| When PMRDC defaulted in the payment of its obligations, Garon sent a demand letter[9] dated November 3, 1998, requiring PMRDC to execute and deliver a unilateral Deed of Assignment of its leasehold rights over the commercial spaces covered by OCLT Nos. 1108 and 0161. Garon also sent a formal demand letter[10] dated November 6, 1998 for SICI to comply with its obligation under the surety bond. | |||||
|
2005-11-11 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| The Court notes that the principal issues raised by the petitioners are factual: (1) whether the respondent, based on the evidence on record, is the assignee of the petitioners' account with CarMerchants, Inc. (as the vendor of the motor vehicle), and (2) whether the respondent is entitled to attorney's fees of 22.10% of the total amount due from the petitioners. It is settled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised.[20] This rule, however, is not without exceptions. Factual issues may be resolved by this Court in cases where (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the CA went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[21] Upon careful review of the records, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA misappreciated the evidence on record and as such, the ruling in this case needs to be modified. | |||||
|
2004-12-01 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| "7.8 The Government Share shall be deemed to include all of the following sums: "(a) all Government taxes, fees, levies, costs, imposts, duties and royalties including excise tax, corporate income tax, customs duty, sales tax, value added tax, occupation and regulatory fees, Government controlled price stabilization schemes, any other form of Government backed schemes, any tax on dividend payments by the Contractor or its Affiliates in respect of revenues from the Mining Operations and any tax on interest on domestic and foreign loans or other financial arrangements or accommodations, including loans extended to the Contractor by its stockholders; "(b) any payments to local and regional government, including taxes, fees, levies, costs, imposts, duties, royalties, occupation and regulatory fees and infrastructure contributions; "(c) any payments to landowners, surface rights holders, occupiers, indigenous people or Claimowners; "(d) costs and expenses of fulfilling the Contractor's obligations to contribute to national development in accordance with Clause 10.1(i) (1) and 10.1(i) (2); "(e) an amount equivalent to whatever benefits that may be extended in the future by the Government to the Contractor or to financial or technical assistance agreement contractors in general; "(f) all of the foregoing items which have not previously been offset against the Government Share in an earlier Fiscal Year, adjusted for inflation." (Italics supplied) Section 7.8(e) is out of place in the FTAA. It makes no sense why, for instance, money spent by the government for the benefit of the contractor in building roads leading to the mine site should still be deductible from the State's share in net mining revenues. Allowing this deduction results in benefiting the contractor twice over. It constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor at the expense of the government, since the latter is effectively being made to pay twice for the same item.[91] For being grossly disadvantageous and prejudicial to the government and contrary to public policy, Section 7.8(e) is undoubtedly invalid and must be declared to be without effect. Fortunately, this provision can also easily be stricken off without affecting the rest of the FTAA. | |||||
|
2004-05-25 |
TINGA, J, |
||||
| The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule, and must be supported by factual, legal and equitable justifications.[36] In previously decided cases, the Court awarded attorney's fees where a party acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the other party's claims and compelled the former to litigate to protect his rights;[37] when the action filed is clearly unfounded,[38] or where moral or exemplary damages are awarded. [39] However, in cases where both parties have legitimate claims against each other and no party actually prevailed, such as in the present case where the claims of both parties were sustained in part, an award of attorney's fees would not be warranted.[40] | |||||