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ALMA COSEP v. NLRC

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

2011-10-19
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
We have also previously held that the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure and due process dictates that no worker shall be dismissed except for a just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process is observed.[21]  Even as we now recognize the right to continuous, unbroken employment of workers who are absorbed into a new company pursuant to a merger, it is but logical that their employment may be terminated for any causes provided for under the law or in jurisprudence without violating their right to security of tenure.  As Justice Carpio discussed in his dissenting opinion, it is well-settled that termination of employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied in a CBA is recognized in our jurisdiction.[22]  In Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Saldivar,[23] we explained the rationale for this policy in this wise: Article 279 of the Labor Code ordains that "in cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by [Title I, Book Six of the Labor Code]." Admittedly, the enforcement of a closed-shop or union security provision in the CBA as a ground for termination finds no extension within any of the provisions under Title I, Book Six of the Labor Code. Yet jurisprudence has consistently recognized, thus: "It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason, the law has allowed stipulations for 'union shop' and 'closed shop' as means of encouraging workers to join and support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interests vis-a-vis the employer."[24] (Emphasis supplied.)
2009-06-23
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for just cause. When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.[29]
2008-03-28
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Time and again we reiterate the established rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts[17] and does not routinely undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, and are binding upon this Court,[18] when supported by substantial evidence.[19]
2008-03-28
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for just cause. When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.[24]
2007-02-08
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.[70] The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility.  A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.[71]  An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.[72] In Cosep v. NLRC,[73] this Court held that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final by law are not exempt from judicial review for want of substantial basis in fact and in law.