This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-11-12 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| The Court likewise finds no cogent reason to overturn the CA's award of moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 and attorney's fees. Moral damages is awarded when fraud and bad faith have been established,[46] as in this case. Petitioners' false contention over what has been paid to Angus suggests an attempt to feign compliance with their legal obligation to grant their employee all the benefits provided for by agreement and law. Their bad faith is evident in the intent to circumvent this legal mandate. And as Angus was then forced to litigate her just claims when petitioners refused to heed her demands for the payment of separation pay, the award of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amount of separation pay is also in order.[47] | |||||
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2013-06-03 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Fraud or malice (dolo) has been defined as a "conscious and intentional design to evade the normal fulfillment of existing obligations" and is, thus, incompatible with good faith.[44] In the case at bar, we find that respondent Rowena was guilty of fraud in the performance of her obligation under the subject contract to sell because (1) she knew that she had not yet paid the full price (having paid only 32.58% thereof) when she had the title to the subject land transferred to her name, and (2) she orchestrated the aforesaid transfer of title without the knowledge and consent of petitioners. Her own testimony and documentary evidence established this fact. Where fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of moral damages is proper.[45] Further, under Article 2208(2)[46] of the Civil Code, the award of attorney's fees is proper where the plaintiff is compelled to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest because of the defendant's act or omission. Here, respondent Rowena's aforesaid acts caused petitioners to incur expenses in litigating their just claims. We, thus, find respondent Rowena liable for moral damages and attorney's fees which we fix at P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively.[47] | |||||
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2008-07-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| While the land was declared in Maxima's name for taxation purposes, it did not establish Maxima's ownership of the same. We have held that a tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership.[17] It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.[18] Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one's ownership.[19] Petitioners' reliance on Maxima's tax declaration in assuming that she owned Parcel One is an erroneous assumption that should not prejudice the rights of the real owners. | |||||
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2004-06-03 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| It is a well-settled rule that only questions of law may be reviewed by the Supreme Court in an appeal by certiorari.[20] Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court.[21] The only time this Court will disregard the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (which are ordinarily accorded great respect) is when these are based on speculation, surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on substantial evidence.[22] | |||||
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2003-07-31 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Petitioners' argument that they have declared the disputed lot in their name and have paid the realty taxes thereof is unavailing, because tax declarations are not conclusive proof of title.[16] At best they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.[17] Thus, it has been held in one case[18] that a party's declaration of real property, his payment of realty taxes and his designation as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey and in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office cannot defeat a certificate of title, which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.[19] | |||||
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2000-12-08 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| On the first issue. The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was brought about by erosion and not a change in the river's course. This conclusion was reached after the trial judge observed during ocular inspection that the banks located on petitioner's land are sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land on the other side of the river. Additionally, the riverbank on respondent's side is lower and gently sloping. The lower land therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried by the river current.[11] These findings are factual, thus conclusive on this Court, unless there are strong and exceptional reasons, or they are unsupported by the evidence on record, or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[12] These factual findings are based on an ocular inspection of the judge and convincing testimonies, and we find no convincing reason to disregard or disbelieve them. | |||||