This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2015-11-10 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Considered in the light of the foregoing factual antecedents, the next question that pleads for the Court's resolution is whether or not Block 494 was effectively removed from the commerce of men as claimed by HATVI. In resolving this issue in the negative, uppermost in the mind of the Court is the parties' admission during the pre-trial stage that the development of Talayan Village was pursuant to Subdivision Plan PSD-52256 which was approved by the CFI of Rizal in LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 7681. Rather than Block 494, said subdivision plan significantly designated Block 503 as the park/open space for said subdivision. That J.M., Tuason donated Block 494 to the Quezon City government in compliance with the latter's ordinances also did not operate to divest the property of its private character. In addition to the fact that the donation was not embodied in a public document as provided under Article 749[40] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the record is entirely bereft of showing that said donation was duly accepted in accordance with Article 745[41] of the same Code. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor.[42] Since the donation is considered perfected only upon the moment the donor is apprised of such acceptance, it has been ruled that lack of such acceptance, as expressly provided under the law, renders the donation null and void.[43] | |||||
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2009-02-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the Deed of Donation and the separate instrument embodying the acceptance.[41] At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of Acceptance bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by petitioner. For this reason, even Esperanza's one-third share in the subject property cannot be adjudicated to the petitioner. | |||||