This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2016-01-20 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Article 19 of the Civil Code "prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all rights' by setting certain standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof."[31] Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[32] | |||||
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2013-02-18 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Pursuant to said credit line account and trust receipts, plaintiff-appellee Planters Products, Inc. and defendants-appellants Spouses de la Cruz are bound to fulfill what has been expressly stipulated therein. It is well-settled in Barons Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[30] to wit: "It may not be amiss to state that petitioner's contract with private respondent has the force of law between them. Petitioner is thus bound to fulfill what has been expressly stipulated therein. In the absence of any abuse of right, private respondent cannot be allowed to perform its obligation under such contract in parts. Otherwise, private respondent's right under Article 1248 will be negated, the sanctity of its contract with petitioner defiled. The principle of autonomy of contracts must be respected." (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
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2010-08-25 |
BRION, J. |
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| It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging it.[40] Although it took AMEX some time before it approved Pantaleon's three charge requests, we find no evidence to suggest that it acted with deliberate intent to cause Pantaleon any loss or injury, or acted in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. We give credence to AMEX's claim that its review procedure was done to ensure Pantaleon's own protection as a cardholder and to prevent the possibility that the credit card was being fraudulently used by a third person. | |||||
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2005-11-11 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule, and it must have some factual, legal and equitable bases.[51] The stipulation on attorney's fees contained in the Deed constitutes what is known as a penal clause.[52] The award of attorney's fees by the lower court, therefore, is not in the nature of an indemnity but rather a penalty in the form of liquidated damages in accordance with the contract between petitioner and Roblett. Such a stipulation has been upheld by this Court as binding between the parties so long as it does not contravene the law, morals, public order or public policy.[53] Hence, it was improper for the appellate court to have deleted the award of attorney's fees to petitioner despite the express stipulation therefor contained in the Deed. | |||||
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2005-02-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| To the mind of this Court, the twin elements of probable cause and malice are lacking in the case at bar to entitle petitioner to damages he now seeks out. For one, it is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon a party alleging the same.[28] In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of respondents. For another, there are no factual allegations in the complaint that can support a finding that malice and bad faith motivated the respondents in filing the two informations against petitioner. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law. [29] From our reading of the complaint for damages arising from malicious prosecution and from the records of the case, we find no ultimate facts to buttress these conclusions of law. | |||||
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2004-06-04 |
PUNO, J. |
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| To include the full payment of the obligations with the SSS and Apex as a condition would be to unnecessarily stretch and put a new meaning to the provisions of the agreement. For, as a general rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, such written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[12] And, it is a familiar doctrine in obligations and contracts that the parties are bound by the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions they have agreed to, which is the law between them, the only limitation being that these stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions are not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy.[13] Not being repugnant to any legal proscription, the agreement entered into by the parties must be respected and each is bound to fulfill what has been expressly stipulated therein.[14] | |||||
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2004-02-13 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| "The principle of autonomy of contracts must be respected."[41] The Compromise Agreement was a contract perfected by mere consent;[42] hence, it should have been respected. Item 3 thereof provided that failure of petitioner to pay within the stipulated period would entitle respondent to a writ of execution to enforce all the claims that had been pleaded by the latter in the Complaint. This provision must be upheld, because the Agreement supplanted the Complaint itself. Although judicial approval was not required for the perfection of that Agreement once it was granted, it could not and must not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery.[43] | |||||
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2002-09-27 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case.[11] The same principles are now necessarily adhered to and are applied by the Court of Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated through a petition for certiorari; thus, we see no error on its part when it made anew a factual determination of the matters and on that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC. Glaring however is the discrepancy between the text of the decision of the appellate court which declares that respondent Florendo-Flores "was unlawfully constructively dismissed" from employment,[12] and its dispositive portion which declares that "the | |||||