This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2005-01-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Members of the bench have always been reminded that the unreasonable delay in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate.[13] The need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously has been consistently impressed upon judges on the principle that justice delayed is justice denied.[14] Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.[15] Inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency[16] warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.[17] | |||||
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2004-10-18 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Judge Misajon humiliated complainant in the presence of other court personnel, the parties or the public. All judges should always observe courtesy and civility.[13] They should be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.[14] Indeed, Judge Misajon can hold her colleagues in the Bench and her staff to the efficient performance of their duties without being offensive in her speech, remembering always that courtesy begets courtesy. | |||||
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2004-10-18 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| The 1987 Constitution mandates trial judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases and matters within three (3) months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum.[6] In the disposition of cases, members of the bench have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to the foregoing rule to prevent delay, a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in our justice system. | |||||
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2004-09-20 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| As early as December 14, 2001, and prior to his receipt of the August 12 directive, Judge Suan had already incurred a delay in twenty-four (24) cases, according to the report of the judicial audit team. Such delays were in violation of the rule that judges should dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the specified period. Under the Constitution, trial judges are given only ninety days -- from the filing of the last pleading, brief and memorandum -- within which to resolve the matter at hand.[17] | |||||
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2000-08-16 |
PURISIMA, J. |
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| organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.[14] Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.[15] Furthermore, if the caseload of the judge prevents the disposition of cases within the reglementary periods, he should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved. This is to avoid or dispel any suspicion that something sinister is going on.[16] But there is no showing in the records of the present case that Judge Sultan asked for such an extension. All that he did was to inform this Court in his letter of June 28, 1999 that in view of his up and coming retirement on November 2, 1999 "he can no longer render full and complete attention to his cases, including cases for decision". Having served as such judge for a considerable length of time, Judge Sultan ought to have known that the norm in regard to extension of the aforesaid reglementary period for decision has always been to ask this Court for the same, giving valid justification therefor. Similarly, the Court is unconvinced of Judge Sultan's vain attempt to evade accountability for his failure to submit the periodic docket inventories[17] by passing the blame to his Clerk of Court. This attitude towards his very own duties is | |||||