This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2014-11-24 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The settled rule is that the nature of the action as appearing from the averments in the complaint or other initiatory pleading determines the jurisdiction of a court; hence, such averments and the character of the relief sought are to be consulted.[23] The court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the averments of ultimate facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading regardless of whether or not the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.[24] The reliefs to which the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled based on the facts averred, although not the reliefs demanded, determine the nature of the action.[25] The defense contained in the answer of the defendant is generally not determinant.[26] | |||||
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2008-07-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While it appears that there was personal cultivation[34] by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding, what was established was that petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be adduced.[35] Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests on the shoulders of petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which burden they failed to discharge with substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts.[36] The same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[37] While it might have been shown and not contested that petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, namely JACINTO, PABLO, JUANITO and FRANCISCO[38] occupied the subject landholding as tillers thereof, the records support the fact that their occupancy was in the nature of hired laborers of JOSEFINA. This was the factual finding of the Provincial Adjudicator which was seconded by the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, there is evidence to support that the subject landholding was not tenanted. As can be gleaned from the Entry No. E-17-7182,[39] annotated on 2 June 1977 at the back of TCT No. 103275, covering the subject landholding in the name of JOSEFINA, the same was not tenanted. Moreover, Entry No. E-22-4361, dated 26 March 1982, also annotated on the aforesaid certificate of title, is explicit that the subject landholding is not tenanted. [40] Further, the records reveal that petitioners' predecesssors-in- interest, namely PABLO, JACINTO, FRANCISCO and JUANITO, executed an affidavit on 8 December 1988, attesting that they were working on the subject landholding as "hired laborers only." These facts taken together were deemed by both the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals to be corroborative of the entries annotated on TCT No. 103275 that the subject landholding was indeed not tenanted, and that petitioners' predecessors-in- interest were hired laborers of JOSEFINA. Such type of occupation on the subject landholding does not create a presumption of tenancy in petitioners' favor. Clearly, the fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy.[41] | |||||
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2008-06-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| It is an elementary principle that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used if the proper remedy is appeal. Being an extraordinary remedy, a party can only avail himself of certiorari, if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[13] Here, appeal is the correct mode but was not seasonably utilized by the petitioner. Resort to this petition for certiorari is, therefore, improper because certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal.[14] Petitions for certiorari are limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. For, it is basic that certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.[15] It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. It is not to be used for any other purpose, such as to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact, as what petitioner would like the Court to venture into. A petition for certiorari not being the proper remedy to correct errors of judgment as alleged in the instant case, the herein petition should be dismissed pursuant to SC Circular No. 2-90.[16] | |||||
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2005-11-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In sum, private respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was an agricultural tenant[26] of Magpily and that the instant case involves an agrarian dispute cognizable by the DARAB. The MTC thus lawfully took cognizance of the present controversy which involves the gratuitous occupation of another's property which became unlawful by virtue of the owner's withdrawal of consent or tolerance to such occupation. | |||||
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2004-10-06 |
CORONA, J. |
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| We agree with the appellate court that the remedy availed of by petitioners was inappropriate as Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal,[4] and that, in any event, petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution. | |||||
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2003-09-10 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| "What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant's entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand."[19] It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint[20] and the character of the relief sought.[21] | |||||
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2003-08-28 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.[20] This is basic. Unquestionably, petitioner lodged an action for ejectment before the MTC.[21] Under BP 129, the allegations in the complaint conferred initiatory jurisdiction on that first level court. | |||||
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2000-06-19 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause - the right to act in a case.[12] It is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal.[13] It is determined by the averments of the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer.[14] Hence, the jurisdictional issue involved here shall be determined upon an examination of the applicable laws and the allegations of petitioners' complaint before the HLURB. | |||||