This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2013-07-03 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In the face of this positive identification, accused-appellant puts up the defense of alibi, claiming that he was sleeping in his house at the time of the incident. It has been consistently held by this Court that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.[18] In the case of accused-appellant, however, it was established in his very own direct testimony that his house is within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime: Q Where were you when the incident happened on August 27, 2000 on or about 12:30 in the morning? | |||||
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2012-02-01 |
SERENO, J. |
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| The element of intent - on which this Court shall focus - is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result.[121] On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus - that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought."[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[125] | |||||
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2010-07-07 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| As consistently enunciated by this Court, the established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.[22] From the aforequoted findings of the trial court, accused-appellants failed to demonstrate satisfactorily that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The crime of murder happened in San Juan Evangelista St., Payatas, Quezon City or exactly the same area where accused-appellants' houses were located and claimed to be sleeping when the crime occurred. Weak as it is, alibi becomes weaker in the face of the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses as in this case.[23] | |||||
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2008-06-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As consistently enunciated by this Court, the established doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or within its immediate vicinity. The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence, the reason being that it is easily manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence. This is especially true in case of positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses, which renders their alibis worthless. Positive identification prevails over denials and alibis.[67] | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In the case at bar, accused-appellant claimed that on 24 December 1999 and 8 January 2000, he was in Sariaya, Quezon working in his tailoring shop. He, however, did not present any witness to corroborate such claim. Unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, his alibi is self-serving and deserves no weight in law; thus, same must necessarily fail. An alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and where such defense is not corroborated, it is fatal to the accused.[30] Uncorroborated alibi must be disregarded.[31] | |||||
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2004-05-20 |
VITUG, J. |
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| The defense of alibi might prosper if it is at least shown (1) that the accused is in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, and (2) that it would have been physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene[3] or within its immediate vicinity.[4] Alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration, but it also does not on its face demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the place and time of the commission of the offense.[5] Appellant himself has admitted that while his class would end at one o'clock in the afternoon, he occasionally would still go back to school late in the afternoon to oversee the school's poultry project. | |||||
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2002-06-06 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As regards the defense of denial proffered by the accused, it is rather weak as there is no doubt that he was the one who perpetrated the acts complained of. He was positively identified by eyewitness Clarita Chua while he was still detained in Camp Karingal and then again inside the courtroom. According to her, [s]he remembered him because of his face, his clothes and his haircut. Her identification is entitled to great weight. The conditions of visibility were favorable. Although the accused was on the other side of the van and its windows were tinted, the sun, according to her, was shining bright at that time such that she could clearly see the person on the other side thereof. Moreover, the glass windows were not heavily tinted and it was accused who opened the door (TSN, February 24, 1998, pp. 47, 51 and 53). There was, therefore, every opportunity for her to see his face. ...[16] (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court rejected appellant's defense consisting mainly of denial. Clarita Chua placed him at the scene and time of the robbery and saw him shoot Mario dela Cruz. In convicting appellant, the trial court relied on the testimony of private complainant whose account of the incident it found to be "positive and categorical."[17] Such positive testimony prevails over appellant's denial[18] of any participation in the robbery with homicide. As established at the trial, Clarita had no ulterior motive to falsely testify against appellant whom she has never met prior to the robbery. Her testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.[19] | |||||