This case has been cited 2 times or more.
|
2009-04-07 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The "ample opportunity to be heard" standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the employee's right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is overly restrictive. The "very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."[22] | |||||
|
2006-10-30 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| 4) That the covering bidding documents for the alleged public bidding conducted on 08 December 1997 were signed by me in my residence.[28] As can be gathered from the foregoing, the affiants declared that no public bidding was held on December 8, 1997. However, said declaration is merely an expression of an opinion and not a fact considering that like prosecution witnesses Ronquillo and Mayor Dizon, they also have no personal knowledge as to whether or not a bidding was indeed conducted at the Municipal Library of Guimba, Nueva Ecija on December 8, 1997. Pursuant to Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the opinion of witnesses, as in the instant case, is not admissible. Since affiants were not in the place where the alleged bidding was held, they are not in the position to declare with moral certainty that no such bidding in fact occurred. Their statements that they signed the documents showing that they participated in the determination of the lowest bidder with knowledge that they did not in fact so participate therein, bind only them and not petitioners whose whereabouts on December 8, 1997 were not established to be known to said affiants. And while the Information alleged conspiracy such that the acts of the affiants may be attributed as well to petitioners Bernardino and Tomas, the same cannot be considered against said petitioners inasmuch as no evidence was presented by the prosecution to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It cannot be based on mere conjectures but must be established as a fact.[29] | |||||