This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2011-05-31 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In a letter[24] dated February 8, 2002, Land Bank expressed its willingness to pay Galang Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy. It, however, refused to include PERA and RATA as part of his back salaries for 1990 to 1995; the former, because it was authorized to be paid to LBP employees only in 1997 and the latter, because he was unable to discharge the functions of his office. Land Bank further explained that Galang could not be reinstated, or his back wages paid from October 1, 1997 since there was yet no final and executory decision of the court then. The bank maintained that his salaries were computed correctly, based on the prevailing rate for the period when he was unable to work in accordance with the Court's ruling in Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals.[25] | |||||
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2010-04-23 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In Sales v. Mathay,[19] therein petitioner Romulo Sales' penalty of dismissal was reduced by the CSC to six (6) months suspension based on its finding that, at most, petitioner should be found guilty only of gross neglect of duty. His prayer that he be paid back salaries during the period that he was prevented to work as Postal Clerk II in the Pinamalayan Post Office was denied. The Court held that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. The general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service.As he works, he shall earn.[20] | |||||
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2007-10-19 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, it was explained that "[t]he fact that the conventional term 'strike' was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation and not its appearance, will be deemed controlling."[36] The term "strike" has been elucidated to encompass not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy, or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.[37] | |||||
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2007-01-24 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals,[31] the Court ruled that "the fact that the conventional term 'strike' was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling."[32] The term "strike" encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.[33] | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| There is hardly any dispute about the formal charges against the 278 affected GSIS employees a mix of KMG union and non-union members - having arose from their having gone on unauthorized leave of absence (AWOL) for at least a day or two in the October 4 to 7, 2004 stretch to join the ranks of the demonstrators /rallyists at that time. As stated in each of the formal charges, the employee's act of attending, joining, participating and taking part in the strike/rally is a transgression of the rules on strike in the public sector. The question that immediately comes to the fore, therefore, is whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. If in the affirmative, then the denounced filing of the administrative charges would be prima facie tenable, inasmuch as engaging in mass actions resulting in work stoppage or service disruption constitutes, in the minimum, the punishable offense of acting prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[12] If in the negative, then such filing would indeed smack of arbitrariness and justify the issuance of a corrective or preventive writ. | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals.[21] In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr.,[22] that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike. | |||||
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2006-11-22 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Respondent could not even claim that she was denied due process. She was accorded the opportunity to be heard. She was required to answer and to attend the investigation to adduce evidence on her behalf. She filed her answer but she merely generally denied having received the subject checks or any other involvement therein. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. For as long as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demand of due process were sufficiently met.[27] "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.[28] In this case, respondent was given ample opportunity to be heard and to present her case. | |||||