This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-11-25 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Petitioners Saguin and Grado, together with Ruby C. Dalman (Dalman), all of Rizal Memorial District Hospital (RMDH), Dapitan City, were charged with violation of P.D. No. 1752,[6] as amended by R.A. No. 7742 before the MTCC in the Information, dated December 4, 1997, which reads: The Undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, accuses EDITHA B. SAGUIN, LANI D. GRADO and RUBY C. DALMAN for Violation of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752 as amended by Executive Order 35 and Republic Act No. 7742, committed as follows: | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Even if petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari, which would have been the proper remedy, the same would still fail. The Court finds that the labor arbiter did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when he issued the 25 August 1998 Order. For one, the holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right.[31] Section 4, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC[32] grants a labor arbiter wide latitude to determine, after the submission by the parties of their position papers/memoranda, whether there is need for a formal trial or hearing.[33] As this court has so often held, a formal type or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of controversy.[34] In one case, this Court held that a party has no vested right to a formal hearing simply and merely because the labor arbiter granted its motion and set the case for hearing.[35] | |||||
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2006-10-30 |
TINGA, J. |
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| It is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[26] In labor cases, it has been held that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held[27] since a formal type or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of controversy.[28] | |||||
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2000-06-19 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| PETITIONER's motion for reconsideration[11] was denied.[12] Hence, on 6 November 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition before this Court assailing the 1995 and the 1996 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742 for being contrary to law. In support thereof, PETITIONER contends that the subject 1995 Amendments issued by HDMF are inconsistent with the enabling law, P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, which merely requires as a pre~condition for exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior provident/ retirement plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans. Hence, considering that PETITIONER has a provident plan superior to that offered by the HDMF, it is entitled to exemption from the coverage in accordance with Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. The 1996 Amendment are also void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HMDF. | |||||