This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2016-01-27 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine.[36] The case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al. thoroughly explained the meaning and substance of right to cross-examine as an integral component of due process with a colatilla that the same right may be expressly or impliedly waived, to quote: The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.[37] | |||||
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2015-01-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Justice Velasco's dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes (Reyes case),[15] an administrative case, in which a different set of rules of procedure and standards apply. Sen. Estrada's Petition, in contrast, involves the preliminary investigation stage in a criminal case. Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes case, while Rule II on the Procedure in Criminal Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen. Estrada's Petition. In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character or by analogy.[16] | |||||
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2012-11-14 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record.[7] This rule, however, is not without exceptions, one of which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court which necessitates a review of such factual findings.[8] | |||||
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2008-10-24 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Here, the evidence shows that USM Avenue, Kabacan, Cotabato where accused-appellant allegedly was on September 15, 1995 is only 1.5 kilometers away from the public market and terminal in Poblacion, Kabacan, Cotabato where the crime was committed.[20] According to the trial court, this distance between the crime scene and the whereabouts of accused-appellant can easily be negotiated by foot within 10 to 15 minutes.[21] In short, accused-appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime on the date and time of its commission. Moreover, the defense of alibi crumbles in the face of the positive identification of accused-appellant by the aforesaid prosecution witnesses as the perpetrator of the crime.[22] | |||||
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2004-02-18 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| True, Payla made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his impending death. The law, however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death.[36] The foreboding may be gleaned from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarant's injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was consciousness of impending death.[37] | |||||