This case has been cited 10 times or more.
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2014-10-22 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The petitioners' disregard of the fundamental conditions precluded the success of their recourse. To start with, the petitioners did not show that the MTC had no jurisdiction, or exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that would have opened the way to their success with the recourse. Yet, the door remained unopened to them because the denial by the MTC of the motion to quash was procedurally and substantively correct because the duration of the physical incapacity or medical attendance should be dealt with only during the trial on the merits, not at the early stage of dealing with and resolving the motion to quash. As to the second condition, the fact that the denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the MTC did not yet completely terminate its proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper recourse of the petitioners was to enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and should the decision of the MTC be adverse to them in the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal from the judgment and assign as error the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.[33] Certiorari was not available to them in the RTC because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. | |||||
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2008-03-06 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| On petitioner's assertion that the assailed administrative orders amount to deprivation of property without due process, suffice it to state that this Court will not rule on constitutional issues if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case.[25] Anyway, petitioner failed to substantiate its claim of deprivation of property without due process. Nothing shows how petitioner was deprived of its property or which property was taken from petitioner. To repeat, there is no new or additional fee or charges which petitioner has to pay. Even before the introduction of the direct collection system, petitioner used to pay the 10% government share as part of the fees it pays the pilots. | |||||
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2007-09-21 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Clearly, the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the election protest, considering the fact regarding estoppel on petitioner's part, as well as the COMELEC's mandate to ascertain the true victor in election contests. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[18] There was no such abuse committed by the COMELEC here. | |||||
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2007-02-14 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| On the other hand, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for review under Rule 45, the petition would fail because only judgments or final orders that completely dispose of the case can be the subject of a petition for review.[14] In this case, the assailed Orders are only interlocutory orders. Petitioner should have proceeded with the trial of the case and if the trial court renders an unfavorable verdict, petitioner should assail the Orders as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment to be rendered in this case.[15] | |||||
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2007-02-06 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| On a final note, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[22] The Court finds no such abuse of discretion in this case. | |||||
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2006-07-14 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power. The special civil action of certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion. Where the court has jurisdiction over a case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts will at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari. In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.[28] Here, the CA did not make any finding at all on the issue of prescription. | |||||
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2006-04-19 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| Neither can the petition be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As pointed out by respondent Fiscal, the petition does not allege grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is the ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[18] In this connection, it is only upon showing that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that an interlocutory order such as that involved in this case may be impugned. Be that as it may, it must be emphasized that this practice is applied only under certain exceptional circumstances to prevent unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and so as not to unduly burden the courts. [19] | |||||
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2005-02-16 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| In Latican vs. Vergara, this Court defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[13] | |||||
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2004-12-09 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Basic is the principle that a constitutional issue may only be passed upon if essential to the decision of a case or controversy.[19] Even if all the requisites for judicial review are present, this Court will not entertain a constitutional question unless it is the very lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of a statute or general law.[20] Thus, in Sotto v. Commission on Elections,[21] we held | |||||