This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2011-02-01 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| Moreover, bearing in mind what the Court said in Tañada v. Angara, "that it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government,"[25] we cannot but resolve head on the issues raised before us. Indeed, where an action of any branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution or is done with grave abuse of discretion, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle it. As in this petition, issues are precisely raised putting to the fore the propriety of the Agreement pending the ratification of the Rome Statute. | |||||
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2006-08-10 |
PUNO, J. |
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| Based on the foregoing provisions, prior Presidential authorization is required before the petitioner, being a government-owned and controlled corporation, could purchase the subject vehicles. Verily, Letter of Instruction No. 667 is not a "mere technicality" as petitioner contends, otherwise, administrative agencies would be free to utilize such funds freely as long as they can justify their use through the mere invocation of laudable purposes. Since the disallowance was made pursuant to the applicable law, it cannot be assailed as an act of grave abuse of discretion. In Tañada v. Angara,[9] this Court ruled that:By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. x x x. | |||||
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2005-07-29 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| In Tañada v. Angara,[33] this Court elaborated on the meaning of Section 12, Article XII of the Constitution in this wise:[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.[34] This Court notes that the Executive Department, with its subsequent issuance of Executive Order Nos. 444 and 303, has provided certain measures to prevent unfair competition. In particular, Executive Order Nos. 444 and 303 have restricted the special shopping privileges to certain individuals.[35] Executive Order No. 303 has limited the range of items that may be sold in the duty-free outlets,[36] and imposed sanctions to curb abuses of duty-free privileges.[37] With these measures, this Court finds no reason to strike down Executive Order No. 97-A for allegedly being prejudicial to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. | |||||
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2004-01-13 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| unfamiliar waters. More fundamentally, the question was not raised in the Petition. In closing, I refer to the definition of "grave abuse of discretion" which the Court made in Tañada v. Angara,[74] cited at the opening of the Decision:[75] | |||||