This case has been cited 13 times or more.
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2014-11-26 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted testimony of Atanacio for being unreliable and considered him a biased witness simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino. Family relationship, however, does not by itself render a witness' testimony inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight.[14] To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.[15] | |||||
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2011-11-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| The Court is not unaware that drug transactions are usually conducted stealthily and covertly and, hence, the parties usually employed the "kaliwaan system" or the simultaneous exchange of money for the drugs. Still, it baffles the mind how Salcena knew exactly who between Catubay and Esguerra would buy shabu, and how much would be the subject of the transaction despite the absence of an offer to purchase shabu, through words, signs or gestures, made by either of the two tanods. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must also be credible in itself such that common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances.[28] Catubay's story of silent negotiation is just not credible. It simply does not conform to the natural course of things. | |||||
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2010-08-03 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to the conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty of killing his wife. The trial court relied on the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio who heard the appellant and his wife arguing about the latter's illicit relationship with another woman, which supposedly proves motive for him to commit the crime. However, granting that appellant and Betty had an argument on the night before her death, it would be too much to presume that such an argument would drive appellant to kill his wife. Clearly, the motive is not convincing. If at all, the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio merely show a suspicion of appellant's responsibility for the crime. Needless to state, however, suspicion no matter how strong can not sway judgment.[36] In the absence of any other evidence reasonably linking appellant to the crime, evidence of motive is not sufficient to convict him.[37] | |||||
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2007-12-19 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| [93] People v. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57, 96 (1997), citing People v. Maongco, G.R. Nos. 108963-65, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 562, 575. | |||||
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2007-01-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt.[32] The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.[33] If the evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.[34] The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[35] If there exists even one iota of doubt, this Court is "under a long standing injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner."[36] The accused may offer no more than a feeble alibi but we are enjoined to proclaim him innocent in the light of insufficient evidence proving his guilt. | |||||
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2006-09-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous with guilt.[45] The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.[46] If the evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.[47] The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[48] If there exist even one iota of doubt, this Court is "under a long standing legal injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner."[49] | |||||
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2006-01-20 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimony of a witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of substance and value, which if considered, might affect the result of the case.[16] This case is an exception to the rule. | |||||
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2005-06-08 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| It must be stressed that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must also be credible in itself, such that common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference its probability under the circumstances.[28] On the other hand, inconsistencies as to minor details and peripheral or collateral matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses nor the probative weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that their testimonies are fabricated or rehearsed.[29] Even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. As the Court declared in People v. Alolod:[30] | |||||
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2001-02-19 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In his defense, appellant tries to portray the thirteen (13) year-old victim as an erotically accomplished Lolita and a brazenly enticing Salome with morals so flexible or judgment so depraved so as to be willingly deflowered by a man she considers her own father. Appellant's tale, however, is simply too incredible and fantastic to be believed. It is contradicted by findings of the trial court. Recall that the trial court described private complainant as a "guileless, shy and a simple girl," "incapable of being a tease."[20] The court below likewise found that "(t)here is no proof presented by the accused that Maricar had been so corrupted by her environment and by salacious and titillating materials in print, radio, and television as to make her so depraved and sexually amoral as to entice and seduce her own stepfather."[21] As against these findings, all appellant can offer are self-serving statements portraying complainant as an oversexed young Jezebel. Evidence to be believed should proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness, but must also be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience in itself.[22] It is the common experience and observation of mankind that no daughter in her right mind would consent to have carnal knowledge with her own father or stepfather.[23] Thus, the trial court did not err in giving credence not to appellant's hollow protestation but to complainant's testimony that she was threatened and boxed into being appellant's sex slave. No girl would concoct a story of sexual assault, undergo gynecological examination, or subject herself and her family to the trauma and embarrassment concomitant to criminal prosecution unless she speaks the truth.[24] | |||||
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2000-11-23 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| To prove self-defense, appellant presented a sole witness - himself. Hence, the resolution of appellant's guilt or innocence rests much upon the credibility of his testimony. Under the law on evidence, to be credible, testimonial evidence should not only come from the mouth of a credible witness, it should also be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.[16] It should be such that under the common experience and observation of mankind the testimony in question would lead to no other inference than its probability under the circumstances. This holds true especially in cases where there is no test by which to determine its veracity except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.[17] | |||||
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2000-05-31 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| But we agree with the trial court that accused-appellant's defense of alibi does not convince. He failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the time it happened.[21] He admitted that his residence was only three (3) kilometers away, which can be negotiated in just thirty (30) minutes by walking and perhaps a little more than ten (10) minutes by running. And there is the tricycle that is usually available as the means of transportation.[22] On these accounts, the corroboration provided by Silma Dominguez does not assume importance. Alibi is a weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and concoct between relatives, friends and even those not related to the offender.[23] Yet, while the alibi of accused-appellant may be weak, the rule that "alibi must be satisfactorily proved was never intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases; otherwise, we will see the absurdity of an accused being put in a more difficult position where the prosecution's evidence is vague and weak than where it is strong."[24] The prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of the alibi of the accused. It must rely on the strength of its own evidence and establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It failed to do so in this case.[25] | |||||
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2000-03-31 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Again, while it is true that Freddie had a very strong motive to kill Rudico out of revenge on account of the stabbing incident between the latter and Freddie's older brother Rogelio, as well as the subsequent killing of Rufo, another brother of the Noroñas, such fact alone is not sufficient to support a conviction in the absence of adequate and competent proof that Freddie was either the gunwielder or a co-conspirator. Motive, no matter how strong, is not an element of a crime and is generally irrelevant unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator.[12] | |||||