This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2015-09-14 |
JARDELEZA, J. |
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| The authority to create the tripartite committee flows from the jurisdiction conferred by Article 263(g) to the Secretary. A grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it[27]— also referred to as "incidental jurisdiction." Incidental jurisdiction includes the power and authority of an office or tribunal to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgment and mandates. Incidental jurisdiction is presumed to attach upon the conferment of jurisdiction over the main case, unless explicitly withheld by the legislature. In this regard, we find nothing in the Labor Code that prohibits the Secretary from creating ad hoc committees to aid in the resolution of labor disputes after he has assumed jurisdiction. The primary objective of Article 263(g) is not merely to terminate labor disputes between private parties; rather, it is the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest can be inimical to the economy.[28] Hence, provided that the Secretary's orders are reasonably connected with the objective of the law, as it is in this case, courts will not disturb the same. | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| [I]t must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, which has been defined as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society. The police power, together with the power of eminent domain and the power of taxation, is an inherent power of government and does not need to be expressly conferred by the Constitution. x x x.[20] | |||||
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2007-03-07 |
CORONA, J. |
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| Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.[5] This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I. | |||||
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2005-06-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| As the Labor Arbiter observed, faced with the overwhelming evidence presented by respondents on one hand and the mere general denial of petitioner on the other, the invocation of the protective mantle of the law in favor of labor cannot be upheld in this case. This principle cannot be adopted where there is clear and convincing evidence of the truth. While this court endeavors to live up to its mandate that the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration,[24] it cannot do so if it will be at the expense of justice and will result in the oppression or self-destruction of the employer.[25] The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference.[26] | |||||