This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-12-13 |
BRION, J. |
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| In its Reply,[49] the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a party may opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the Sandiganbayan's 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should be done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the petitioner's 3rd motion as a proscribed motion for reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the dictates of substantial justice should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise. | |||||
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2010-08-25 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Executive Order No. 14, series of 1986, issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino, provided that technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to cases involving ill-gotten wealth. Apropos is our pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division):[30] | |||||
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2009-09-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Petitioner cannot capitalize on Ordinance No. 8020 passed by the City Council of Manila which authorized the City to acquire the lot owned by the late spouses Aurelio and Clara Restua for resale to its qualified and bona fide tenants/occupants under the land-for-the-landless program of the City. It should be noted that the Ordinance was approved and took effect only on March 12, 2001 or almost five (5) years after the case for ejectment was filed by respondent on September 23, 1996. Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation (and even policies) shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so.[24] We find no provision in Ordinance No. 8020 which expressly gives it retroactive effect to those tenants with pending ejectment cases against them. Rather, what the said Ordinance provides is that it "shall take effect upon its approval," which was on March 12, 2001. | |||||
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2008-07-23 |
BRION, J. |
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| In Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan[25] we allowed a Rule 65 petition, notwithstanding that the proper remedy is a Rule 45 appeal, to review a Sandiganbayan Decision in view of the importance of the issues raised in the case. We similarly allowed a review under Rule 65 in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)[26] and Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Special First Division)[27] - cases on ill-gotten wealth - on the reasoning that the nature of the cases was endowed with public interest and involved public policy concerns. In the latter Republic v. Sandiganbayan case, we added that substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should be relentlessly and firmly pursued. In the past, we have likewise allowed a similar treatment on the showing that an appeal was an inadequate remedy.[28] That we can single out for special treatment cases involving grave abuse of discretion is supported by no less than the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution which provides:Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversy involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. | |||||
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2006-10-23 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a writ of certiorari lies when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his [/her] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We have consistently held that where the error sought to be corrected neither relates to the court's jurisdiction nor involves grave abuse of discretion, review [of the error] through certiorari will not be allowed. This rule, however, admits exceptions such as (1) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, (2) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his [/her] judgment, (3) where there may be danger of failure of justice, (4) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, (5) where the issue raised is one purely of law, (6) where public interest is involved, and (7) in case of urgency.[47] In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company, we further ruled that: Although Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the [ordinary] course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy - not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari.[48] In this case, while private respondent had other legal remedies against the trial courts' orders, these remedies would be slow, inadequate and insufficient in light of the excessive delay in this case. Private respondent's attempts to collect his fees in 1958 was evident when he intervened in Civil Case Nos. 2608 and 4622. He received a favorable decision after 22 years, or on January 17, 1980, after an appeal to the CA. The Decision became final on July 13, 1981. Since then private respondent had been trying to execute the decision by filing various motions. The trial court, however, frustrated private respondent's efforts when it issued its January 19 and May 13, 1988 Orders. Thereafter, private respondent filed the questioned petition for certiorari and the CA issued its Decision only in 1994. The number of years alone that the private respondent had devoted in enforcing his claim, that is, almost half a century to date, exceptionally calls for certiorari as a more speedy and adequate remedy. The availability of other legal remedies cannot prevent the recourse to certiorari when these remedies would be slow and inadequate to effectively dispense justice in favor of the private respondent. | |||||