This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2005-08-25 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable." In fact, in People vs. Tabag,[7] the Court even admonished the trial court for failing to proceed with the trial of some accused who escaped from preventive detention, to wit:Finally, the trial court also erred in not proceeding with the case against Laureño Awod and Artemio Awod after their successful escape on 19 October 1989 while in preventive detention. They had already been arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to the last sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, trial against them should continue and upon its termination, judgment should be rendered against them notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, both accused have died and the fact of such death is sufficiently established. Conformably with our decision in People v. Salas, their escape should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and the inability of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were to be deemed to have received notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law. This being so, then pursuant to Gimenez v. Nazareno, the trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives' re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them. | |||||
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2004-01-13 |
TINGA, J, |
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| The trial court ruled that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling attended the killing. Nighttime, as a rule, is absorbed in treachery, and should not have been appreciated.[89] The killing, however, was committed in the dwelling of the victim, who did not give any provocation therefor.[90] This aggravating circumstance was, therefore, correctly appreciated. | |||||