Lawyerly

GR No. 161360

2011-10-19

ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED SUBSTITUTED BY CARMEN M. TIONGCO v. JOSE B. TIONGCO

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

The Court reiterated such rule in the case of Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals,[32] wherein we ruled that the imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe.

GR No. 156882

2008-10-31

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS v. CA

VELASCO JR., J.

In reversing the assailed RTC orders, the CA disagreed with the trial court's finding and application of the equitable remedy of laches. Relying on Eduarte v. Court of Appeals[11] and related cases,[12] where the Court applied laches to bar judicial remedies in the plaintiff's exercise of legal rights, as allowing plaintiff to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant, the CA held that the RCAP was not barred by laches from asserting his legal right to cause the annotation of the pertinent paragraphs of the deed of sale on the TCTs covering the subject properties. It ratiocinated that despite the lapse of 37 years, the annotation would not be inequitable or prejudicial to any party since the SVD, under whose name the TCTs of the subject properties were issued, did not interpose any objection to the annotation. It noted that the June 7, 1996 RTC Order did not specify the party who would be prejudiced by the annotation.

GR No. 156310

2008-07-31

XERXES A. ABA DIAN O v. SPS. JESUS AND LOLITA MARTIR

NACHURA, J.

The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of the parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect.[44]

GR NO. 168943

2006-10-27

IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. THELMA A. PONFERRADA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they filed their complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984. The reason for this is that x x x one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.[42] IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72686 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

GR NO. 149231

2006-07-17

ARACLEO ERASUSTA v. AMORIN

GARCIA, J.

Of course it is beyond cavil that the fraudulent registration of the property in the forger Valenzuela's name using the forged deed of sale is not sufficient to vest title to the property in him. Settled is the rule that a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title;[12] registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.[13] Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.[14] The Torrens system has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.[15]

GR NO. 143027

2005-10-11

ENCARNACION L. CUIZON v. MERCEDES C. REMOTO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

What's more, the defense of indefeasibility of the torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.[20] As previously noted, petitioners knew of the existence of the 1968 Deed of Sale as the Remotos showed it to them in 1982, a year before the execution of the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners are transferees in good faith and therefore, the defense of indefeasibility of the torrens title is not applicable to them.

GR NO. 143027

2005-10-11

ENCARNACION L. CUIZON v. MERCEDES C. REMOTO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Lastly, prescription and laches do not apply in this case. To begin with, respondents have been in actual and continuous possession of the property since Angel first bought it in 1968. If a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.[26]

GR NO. 151235

2005-08-28

HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN v. ANGELINA N. DAYRIT

TINGA, J.

In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.[32] Thus, in the case of Lola v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court held that petitioners acquired title to the land owned by respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due to respondent's failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel v. Catalino,[34] this Court said that appellant's passivity and inaction for more than thirty-four (34) years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his behalf. Likewise, in the case of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia,[35] we stated that while the defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor's long continued possession for thirty-seven (37) years, the original owner's right to recover possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latter's long period of possession and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.[36]

GR No. 151235

2005-07-28

HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN v. ANGELINA N. DAYRIT

TINGA, J.

In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.[32] Thus, in the case of Lola v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court held that petitioners acquired title to the land owned by respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due to respondent's failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel v. Catalino,[34] this Court said that appellant's passivity and inaction for more than thirty-four (34) years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his behalf. Likewise, in the case of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia,[35] we stated that while the defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor's long continued possession for thirty-seven (37) years, the original owner's right to recover possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latter's long period of possession and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.[36]

GR NO. 161861

2005-03-11

SPS. WILLIAM AND JULIE LIM v. CHUATOCO

TINGA, J.

The fraudulent registration of the property in Rafael's name using the forged deed of sale is not sufficient to vest title to the entire property in him. Settled is the rule that a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title;[12] registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.[13] Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.[14] The Torrens sytem has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.[15]

GR No. 144225

2003-06-17

SPS. GODOFREDO ALFREDO AND CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO v. SPS. ARMANDO BORRAS AND ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS

CARPIO, J.

To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff's possession of the disputed property is material. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years.[41] The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.[42] However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him.[43] In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.[44]

	GR No. 161360 2011-10-19	ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED SUBSTITUTED BY CARMEN M. TIONGCO v. JOSE B. TIONGCO VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The Court reiterated such rule in the case of Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals,[32] wherein we ruled that the imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe.
	GR No. 156882 2008-10-31	ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS v. CA VELASCO JR., J.
In reversing the assailed RTC orders, the CA disagreed with the trial court's finding and application of the equitable remedy of laches. Relying on Eduarte v. Court of Appeals[11] and related cases,[12] where the Court applied laches to bar judicial remedies in the plaintiff's exercise of legal rights, as allowing plaintiff to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant, the CA held that the RCAP was not barred by laches from asserting his legal right to cause the annotation of the pertinent paragraphs of the deed of sale on the TCTs covering the subject properties. It ratiocinated that despite the lapse of 37 years, the annotation would not be inequitable or prejudicial to any party since the SVD, under whose name the TCTs of the subject properties were issued, did not interpose any objection to the annotation. It noted that the June 7, 1996 RTC Order did not specify the party who would be prejudiced by the annotation.
	GR No. 156310 2008-07-31	XERXES A. ABA DIAN O v. SPS. JESUS AND LOLITA MARTIR NACHURA, J.
The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court finds that the position of the parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect.[44]
	GR NO. 168943 2006-10-27	IGLESIA NI CRISTO v. THELMA A. PONFERRADA CALLEJO, SR., J.
Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they filed their complaint against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory action had not even commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984. The reason for this is that x x x one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.[42] IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72686 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
	GR NO. 149231 2006-07-17	ARACLEO ERASUSTA v. AMORIN GARCIA, J.
Of course it is beyond cavil that the fraudulent registration of the property in the forger Valenzuela's name using the forged deed of sale is not sufficient to vest title to the property in him. Settled is the rule that a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title;[12] registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.[13] Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.[14] The Torrens system has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.[15]
	GR NO. 143027 2005-10-11	ENCARNACION L. CUIZON v. MERCEDES C. REMOTO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
What's more, the defense of indefeasibility of the torrens title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw in his title. The principle of indefeasibility of title is unavailing where there was fraud that attended the issuance of the free patents and titles.[20] As previously noted, petitioners knew of the existence of the 1968 Deed of Sale as the Remotos showed it to them in 1982, a year before the execution of the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners are transferees in good faith and therefore, the defense of indefeasibility of the torrens title is not applicable to them.
	GR NO. 143027 2005-10-11	ENCARNACION L. CUIZON v. MERCEDES C. REMOTO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Lastly, prescription and laches do not apply in this case. To begin with, respondents have been in actual and continuous possession of the property since Angel first bought it in 1968. If a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.[26]
	GR NO. 151235 2005-08-28	HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN v. ANGELINA N. DAYRIT TINGA, J.
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.[32] Thus, in the case of Lola v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court held that petitioners acquired title to the land owned by respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due to respondent's failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel v. Catalino,[34] this Court said that appellant's passivity and inaction for more than thirty-four (34) years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his behalf. Likewise, in the case of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia,[35] we stated that while the defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor's long continued possession for thirty-seven (37) years, the original owner's right to recover possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latter's long period of possession and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.[36]
	GR No. 151235 2005-07-28	HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN v. ANGELINA N. DAYRIT TINGA, J.
In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches.[32] Thus, in the case of Lola v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court held that petitioners acquired title to the land owned by respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due to respondent's failure to assert her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel v. Catalino,[34] this Court said that appellant's passivity and inaction for more than thirty-four (34) years (1928-1962) justifies the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in his behalf. Likewise, in the case of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia,[35] we stated that while the defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessor's long continued possession for thirty-seven (37) years, the original owner's right to recover possession of the property and the title thereto from the defendant has, by the latter's long period of possession and by patentee's inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.[36]
	GR NO. 161861 2005-03-11	SPS. WILLIAM AND JULIE LIM v. CHUATOCO TINGA, J.
The fraudulent registration of the property in Rafael's name using the forged deed of sale is not sufficient to vest title to the entire property in him. Settled is the rule that a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title;[12] registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.[13] Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.[14] The Torrens sytem has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.[15]
	GR No. 144225 2003-06-17	SPS. GODOFREDO ALFREDO AND CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO v. SPS. ARMANDO BORRAS AND ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS CARPIO, J.
To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, plaintiff's possession of the disputed property is material. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years.[41] The ten-year prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.[42] However, if the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him.[43] In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.[44]

FELICIDAD VDA. DE CABRERA v. CA