This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2013-08-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale[5] in favor of respondent Juanito Muertegui[6] (Juanito) over a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered land (the lot) located in Dalutan Island, Talahid, Almeira, Biliran, Leyte del Norte covered by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 1996 issued in 1985 in Garcia's name.[7] | |||||
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2013-08-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| On October 17, 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, petitioner Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (Atty. Sabitsana), through a notarized deed of absolute sale.[8] The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on February 6, 1992.[9] TD No. 1996 was cancelled and a new one, TD No. 5327,[10] was issued in Atty. Sabitsana's name. Although Domingo Jr. and Sr. paid the real estate taxes, Atty. Sabitsana also paid real property taxes in 1992, 1993, and 1999. In 1996, he introduced concrete improvements on the property, which shortly thereafter were destroyed by a typhoon. | |||||
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2012-11-12 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Court litigation is primarily a search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules that gives to both parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out such truth.[36] Thus, a court may suspend its own rules or except a case from them in order to serve the ends of justice; or, it may altogether disregard the rules in a proper case.[37] To cling to the general rule of having the ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty of the counsel bind the client is only to condone rather than to rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his cause to his counsel.[38] | |||||
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2011-10-19 |
SERENO, J. |
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| On 28 January 1996, when Urban Bank refused to pay for his services in connection with the Pasay property, Peña filed a complaint[67] for recovery of agent's compensation and expenses, damages and attorney's fees in RTC-Bago City in the province of Negros Occidental.[68] Interestingly, Peña sued only six out of the eleven members of the Board of the Directors of Urban Bank.[69] No reason was given why the six directors were selected and the others excluded from Peña's complaint. In fact, as pointed out, Atty. Peña mistakenly impleaded as a defendant, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., who was never even a member of the Board of Directors of Urban Bank; while, Ben T. Lim, Sr., father and namesake of Ben Y. Lim, Jr., who had been a director of the bank, already passed away in 1997.[70] | |||||
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2007-03-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Petitioners also averred that the correction of the alleged erroneous entries in the 1996 GIS of MHADC was made by the LDA, MHADC's corporate accountant, only after the lapse of two years from the execution of the said document. They argued that the same was a futile attempt on the part of the private respondents to escape criminal liability since: a) at the time the corrections were made, they had already charged private respondent Ramon H. Monfort with perjury and falsification of private document for including in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC the names of stockholders who were already deceased as elected board directors of MHADC;[28] b) the alleged errors in the 1996 GIS of the MHADC, particularly in the composition of the alleged elected board of directors, is belied by the 1997 GIS of MHADC filed by private respondent Ramon H. Monfort which reiterated the names of the deceased stockholders as elected directors of MHADC; this is not just one mistake but two mistakes already; c) there was ill-motive on the part of the private respondents when it sent, through LDA, a letter to the SEC to correct the alleged errors because at the time such letter was received by the SEC, the City Prosecutor of Cadiz had already issued a resolution in I.S. No. 7883 finding probable cause for perjury against private respondents; and d) at the time of the correction of errors, a total of six or more criminal cases for perjury were already filed by the petitioners against private respondents and some are still pending resolution.[29] | |||||
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2006-07-31 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| Consolidation presupposes that the actions covered by the corresponding order are pending in the same court.[26] Given this perspective, the irresistible conclusion is that the Court, with the consolidation of G.R. No. 160723 with G.R. No. 156383, effectively admitted Chuidian's second motion for reconsideration aforestated and, for all intents and purposes revived his petition in G.R. No. 156383. | |||||
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2001-08-30 |
PARDO, J. |
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| The decision in G. R. No. 93390 did not alter or modify the resolution in G. R. No. 92248. A final judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be altered or modified, except for clerical errors, misprisions or omissions.[26] No "inferior" court has authority to revoke a resolution of a superior court, much less a final and executory resolution of the Supreme Court, the latter itself having no power to revoke the same after it has become final.[27] Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.[28] An order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.[29] | |||||
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2000-11-29 |
PARDO, J. |
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| We find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming respondent Serapio the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on the basis of its perception of the voice of the people of Valenzuela, even without a majority or plurality votes cast in his favor. In fact, without a single vote in his favor as the trial court discarded all the votes. Thus, the decision is not supported by the highest number of valid votes cast in his favor. This violated the right to due process of law of petitioner who was not heard on the issue of failure of election, an issue that was not raised by the protestant. "A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard."[48] The trial court can not decide the election protest case outside the issues raised. If it does, as in this case, the trial court is ousted of its jurisdiction. Likewise, it is a basic principle that a decision with absolutely nothing to support it is void.[49] "A void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked."[50] Here, the trial court indulged in speculations on its view of the voice of the people, and decided the case disregarding the evidence, but on its own intuition, ipse dixit.[51] How was this voice communicated to the trial court? Certainly not by competent evidence adduced before the court as it should be, but by extra-sensory perception. This is invalid in law. Contrary to its own finding that petitioner obtained 83,600 valid votes against 66,602 valid votes for the respondent as second placer, or a plurality of 17,007 votes, the trial court declared the second placer as the winner. This is a blatant abuse of judicial discretion by any account. It is a raw exercise of judicial function in an arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting to evasion of the positive duty to act in accord with law.[52] | |||||