This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2009-04-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Through the years, the Court has never significantly deviated from the Black's Law Dictionary definition of moral turpitude as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."[23] This definition is more specific than that used in In re Vinzon[24] where the term moral turpitude was considered as encompassing "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."[25] | |||||
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2005-06-27 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his probation had the effect of suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code, suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner's conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. [10] | |||||
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2001-11-15 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."[13] | |||||