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GR No. 161589

2014-11-24

PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION v. LEY CONSTRUCTION

BERSAMIN, J.

"In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading."[27] The plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the defendant.[28] The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession.[29] On the other hand, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of the plaintiff's prior possession, if it has in its favor priority in time, it has the security that entitles it to remain on the property until it is lawfully ejected through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria by another having a better right.[30]

GR No. 187677

2013-04-17

REPUBLIC v. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD

SERENO, C.J.

If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is temporarily authorized to determine ownership, if only to determine who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains open to challenge through proper actions.[31] The consequences of Sec. 9, Rule 67 cannot be avoided, as they are due to the intimate relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment.[32]

GR No. 173351

2010-07-29

BF CITILAND CORPORATION v. MARILYN B. OTAKE

CARPIO, J.

Upon the RTC's denial[27] of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review[28] under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court contending that the RTC erred in ruling that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. Petitioner maintained respondent was already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC. In her comment,[29] respondent stressed that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. Respondent reiterated the argument that lack of jurisdiction could be raised anytime. In its reply,[30] petitioner cited Refugia v. Court of Appeals[31] in claiming that the MeTC had limited original jurisdiction in civil actions involving title to or possession of real property depending on the property's assessed value.

GR No. 183606

2009-10-27

CHARLIE T. LEE v. ROSITA DELA PAZ

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The subsequent issuance on 10 December 2003 of Free Patent No. 045802-03-4722 and OCT No. P-46 in respondent's name and of Free Patent No. 045802-03-4723 and OCT No. P-47 in Remedios' name, covering their respective subdivided portions of the 143,417-square-meter property, is of no moment. Noticeably, the free patents and titles of respondent and her assignee only came 12 years after those of petitioner. Faced with the two sets of free patents and OCTs, one in the names of petitioner and the other in the names of respondent and her assignee, covering the same two parcels of land, the Court is more inclined to uphold the validity of the former. The Court can no longer extend the presumption of regularity to respondent's free patents and OCTs since these were preceded by petitioner's free patents and OCTs. Well settled is the rule that once the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property,[36] and the State can no longer award the same to another. The pronouncement of this Court in this case, however, on the validity of the free patents and OCTs of petitioner, on one hand, and those of respondent and her assignee, on the other, is made only in the course of the appreciation by the Court of the evidence submitted by the parties as regards prior possession of the parcels of land in dispute; and is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. Further, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise binds the title or affects the ownership of the land or building.[37]

GR NO. 143331

2007-10-05

FIVE STAR MARKETING CO. v. JAMES L. BOOC

AZCUNA, J.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to the possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to remedy the situation.[51] Stated in another way, the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. And since the law discourages continued wrangling over possession of property for it involves perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided.[52]

GR NO. 153628

2006-07-20

ANACLETO SANTIAGO v. PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORP.

PUNO, J.

It is true that what is determinative in actions for forcible entry is the issue of prior possession.[23] However, where the question of prior possession materially hinges on who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the trial court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. Nonetheless, any pronouncement affecting ownership of the disputed portion is merely provisional, and does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.[24] Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to possession only and is not conclusive as regards the issue of ownership.

GR NO. 125256

2006-05-02

JESUS DURAN v. CARPIO

TINGA, J.

As regards the procedural question of whether the Court of Appeals should have given due course to the petition purportedly filed late because private respondents filed a prohibited motion for reconsideration of the RTC's decision, it is settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the inferior courts in ejectment cases.[12] Petitioners' contention should, perforce, be rejected.

GR No. 130228

2004-07-27

BERNABE FOSTER-GALLEGO v. SPS. ROMEO AND VIVIEN GALANG

CARPIO, J.

Petitioner lost his right to appeal when he exceeded the fifteen-day period[27] granted by law. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on the thirteenth day of his fifteen-day period to appeal. The filing of a motion for reconsideration merely suspends the running of the period to appeal.[28] Once the court denies the motion, the aggrieved party has only the remaining period from receipt of the order of denial to file his appeal.[29] Petitioner thus had only two days from his receipt on 23 January 1995 of the trial court's order denying the reconsideration, or up to 25 January 1995, to perfect his appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's failure to interpose his appeal on time rendered the assailed orders of the trial court final.

GR No. 146364

2004-06-03

COLITO T. PAJUYO v. CA

CARPIO, J.

A party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute for resolution, receives an adverse decision on the merits, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court. [25] Estoppel sets in not because the judgment of the court is a valid and conclusive adjudication, but because the practice of attacking the court's jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting to it is against public policy.[26]

GR No. 146815

2003-04-09

HEIRS OF PEDRO LAURORA v. STERLING TECHNOPARK III

PANGANIBAN, J.

We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession,[15] to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is.[16] No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since respondents' claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue of ownership.[17]

	GR No. 161589 2014-11-24	PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION v. LEY CONSTRUCTION BERSAMIN, J.
"In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the main issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his pleading."[27] The plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was deprived thereof by the defendant.[28] The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession.[29] On the other hand, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the character of the plaintiff's prior possession, if it has in its favor priority in time, it has the security that entitles it to remain on the property until it is lawfully ejected through an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria by another having a better right.[30]
	GR No. 187677 2013-04-17	REPUBLIC v. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD SERENO, C.J.
If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is temporarily authorized to determine ownership, if only to determine who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains open to challenge through proper actions.[31] The consequences of Sec. 9, Rule 67 cannot be avoided, as they are due to the intimate relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment.[32]
	GR No. 173351 2010-07-29	BF CITILAND CORPORATION v. MARILYN B. OTAKE CARPIO, J.
Upon the RTC's denial[27] of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review[28] under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court contending that the RTC erred in ruling that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. Petitioner maintained respondent was already estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC. In her comment,[29] respondent stressed that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over accion publiciana cases. Respondent reiterated the argument that lack of jurisdiction could be raised anytime. In its reply,[30] petitioner cited Refugia v. Court of Appeals[31] in claiming that the MeTC had limited original jurisdiction in civil actions involving title to or possession of real property depending on the property's assessed value.
	GR No. 183606 2009-10-27	CHARLIE T. LEE v. ROSITA DELA PAZ CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The subsequent issuance on 10 December 2003 of Free Patent No. 045802-03-4722 and OCT No. P-46 in respondent's name and of Free Patent No. 045802-03-4723 and OCT No. P-47 in Remedios' name, covering their respective subdivided portions of the 143,417-square-meter property, is of no moment. Noticeably, the free patents and titles of respondent and her assignee only came 12 years after those of petitioner. Faced with the two sets of free patents and OCTs, one in the names of petitioner and the other in the names of respondent and her assignee, covering the same two parcels of land, the Court is more inclined to uphold the validity of the former. The Court can no longer extend the presumption of regularity to respondent's free patents and OCTs since these were preceded by petitioner's free patents and OCTs. Well settled is the rule that once the patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property,[36] and the State can no longer award the same to another. The pronouncement of this Court in this case, however, on the validity of the free patents and OCTs of petitioner, on one hand, and those of respondent and her assignee, on the other, is made only in the course of the appreciation by the Court of the evidence submitted by the parties as regards prior possession of the parcels of land in dispute; and is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. Further, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise binds the title or affects the ownership of the land or building.[37]
	GR NO. 143331 2007-10-05	FIVE STAR MARKETING CO. v. JAMES L. BOOC AZCUNA, J.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to the possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a "time procedure" designed to remedy the situation.[51] Stated in another way, the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. And since the law discourages continued wrangling over possession of property for it involves perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided.[52]
	GR NO. 153628 2006-07-20	ANACLETO SANTIAGO v. PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORP. PUNO, J.
It is true that what is determinative in actions for forcible entry is the issue of prior possession.[23] However, where the question of prior possession materially hinges on who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the trial court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. Nonetheless, any pronouncement affecting ownership of the disputed portion is merely provisional, and does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.[24] Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to possession only and is not conclusive as regards the issue of ownership.
	GR NO. 125256 2006-05-02	JESUS DURAN v. CARPIO TINGA, J.
As regards the procedural question of whether the Court of Appeals should have given due course to the petition purportedly filed late because private respondents filed a prohibited motion for reconsideration of the RTC's decision, it is settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the inferior courts in ejectment cases.[12] Petitioners' contention should, perforce, be rejected.
	GR No. 130228 2004-07-27	BERNABE FOSTER-GALLEGO v. SPS. ROMEO AND VIVIEN GALANG CARPIO, J.
Petitioner lost his right to appeal when he exceeded the fifteen-day period[27] granted by law. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on the thirteenth day of his fifteen-day period to appeal. The filing of a motion for reconsideration merely suspends the running of the period to appeal.[28] Once the court denies the motion, the aggrieved party has only the remaining period from receipt of the order of denial to file his appeal.[29] Petitioner thus had only two days from his receipt on 23 January 1995 of the trial court's order denying the reconsideration, or up to 25 January 1995, to perfect his appeal to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner's failure to interpose his appeal on time rendered the assailed orders of the trial court final.
	GR No. 146364 2004-06-03	COLITO T. PAJUYO v. CA CARPIO, J.
A party who, after voluntarily submitting a dispute for resolution, receives an adverse decision on the merits, is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the court. [25] Estoppel sets in not because the judgment of the court is a valid and conclusive adjudication, but because the practice of attacking the court's jurisdiction after voluntarily submitting to it is against public policy.[26]
	GR No. 146815 2003-04-09	HEIRS OF PEDRO LAURORA v. STERLING TECHNOPARK III PANGANIBAN, J.
We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession,[15] to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is.[16] No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us. Since respondents' claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove prior possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue of ownership.[17]

SPS. MAMERTO REFUGIA AND FELIZA PAYAD-REFUGIA v. CA AND SPS. ARTURO REFUGIA AND AURORA TIMBANG-REFUGIA