This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-01-15 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Claiming that the burns rendered him permanently incapable of working again as a seaman, respondent demanded[10] for the payment of his full disability benefits under Section 20 (B) in relation to Sections 30 and 30-A of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), in the amount of US$60,000.00, which petitioners refused to heed. [11] Thus, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for the same, seeking as well moral and exemplary damages, including attorney's fees. In their position paper, [12] petitioners denied respondent's claims, contending that his injury was self-inflicted and, hence, not compensable under Section 20 (D) of the POEA-SEC. They denied that the vessel's incinerator exploded and claimed that respondent burned himself by pouring paint thinner on his overalls and thereafter set himself on fire. They averred that he was led to commit such act after he was caught last October 10, 2000 [13] stealing the vessel's supplies during a routine security inspection conducted by Captain Bodo Wirth (Captain Wirth) where respondent was informed that he was to be dismissed.[14] They also stated that just before they Based on the aforesaid statement, on October 10, 2000, while the vessel was docked in Hong Kong, Captain Wirth conducted a routine security inspection when he came across a large parcel which belonged to respondent lying on the crew passageway. Upon inspection, the box contained a television set, a day bed cover, several towels and some provisions, all belonging to the vessel. When asked why he was stealing the foregoing articles, respondent claimed that they were given to him as a present by the chief steward. However, when Captain Wirth asked the latter, he denied giving respondent the same. As a result, Captain Wirth informed respondent that his actions warranted his immediate dismissal. discovered respondent to be burning, the vessel's engine room became flooded.[15] They ascribed the flooding incident to respondent, having been seen by fellow crew members standing at the railing around the portside seachest and looking at it[16] and that when the bilge level alarm sounded, he was seen disappearing up to the boiler deck leaving small patches of water on the floor, on the steps, and on the deck where he had been.[17] In support thereof, petitioners submitted the report of the ship captain on the flooding as extracted from the vessel's deck logbook[18] as well as the affidavits and statements executed by the vessel's officers and crew members relative to the flooding and burning incidents. Based on the said affidavits and statements, the vessel's bosun, Antonio Gile (Gile), attested that he saw respondent go to the paint room and there soak his hands in a can full of thinner. Respondent then proceeded to the incinerator door where he was set ablaze. Gile further pointed out that there was no fire in the incinerator at that time.[19] Also, Chief Officer Antonino S. Bejada (Bejada) testified that prior to the burning incident, he had ordered an ordinary seaman who had been burning deck waste in the incinerator to extinguish the fire with water and close up the incinerator door because of bad weather conditions. Bejada then checked the incinerator after the burning incident and found unburnt cardboard cartons inside with no sign of explosion and that the steel plates surrounding it were cool to the touch. He also noticed that the respondent's overalls had patches of green paint on the arms and body and smelled strongly of thinner. An open paint tin can was found near the place of the incident and a cigarette lighter lying beside respondent [20] which oiler Edgardo Israel confirmed was borrowed from him even though he knew that the former did not smoke.[21] Finally, petitioners denied respondent's claim for damages and attorney's fees for lack of factual and legal bases.[22] | |||||
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2011-10-12 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[37] | |||||
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2008-03-04 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.[49]; The fifth cited circumstance is pertinent to the case at bar, in that petitioner asserts that the CA made findings of fact in conflict with those of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. In Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Gramaje,[50] the Court, speaking through Justice Chico-Nazario, held:As borne by the records, it appears that there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC, and that of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, for the purpose of clarity and intelligibility, this Court will make an infinitesimal scrutiny of the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.[51] Hence, despite petitioner raising a question of fact, We opt to take cognizance of the questions brought to Us by petitioner. | |||||
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2006-09-22 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| While the Court, in a petition for review of CA decisions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, usually limits its inquiry only to questions of law, this rule is far from absolute. Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[25] citing Floro v. Llenado,[26] for one, suggests as much. In Floro, we wrote:xxx There are, however, exceptional circumstances that would compel the Court to review the finding of facts of the [CA], summarized in ... and subsequent cases as follows: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the [CA] are based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) ...; 7) ...; 8) ...; 9) when the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of facts ... are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Words in bracket, added.) To the mind of the Court, the instant case is within the purview of at least three of the exceptions listed above, foremost of which is item #9. | |||||
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2001-01-17 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| While factual issues are not within the province of this Court, as it is not a trier of facts and is not required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence de novo,[6] nevertheless, the Court has the authority to review and, in proper cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts in these instances: (a) when the findings of fact of the trial court are in conflict with those of the appellate court; (b) when the judgment of the appellate court is based on misapprehension of facts; and, (c) when the appellate court manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[7] This case falls squarely within the foregoing exceptions. | |||||