This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2012-06-18 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Lastly, we uphold the CA's promulgation of the second amended decision. Verily, all courts of law have the unquestioned power to alter, modify, or set aside their decisions before they become final and unalterable.[27] A judgment that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may thereafter no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.[28] The reason for the rule of immutability is that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, the court could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and continue this practice indefinitely. [29] The equity of a particular case must yield to the overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements.[30] The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and, thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Indeed, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely; the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.[31] As such, the doctrine of immutability is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law. | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| It is never a small matter to maintain that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at the risk of occasional errors.[3] A judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.[4] The reason for the rule is that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, it could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and continue this practice indefinitely.[5] The equity of a particular case must yield to the overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements.[6] | |||||
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2009-04-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The final and executory Decision dated 30 July 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68491, affirming with modification the Decision dated 7 August 2000 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 9441, rendered moot the first issue raised in the instant Petition on the setting by Judge Santelices of the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 9441 on 12 November 1997, purportedly without MIH filing the proper motion for the same and prior to the filing of the last pleading in said case. Clearly, this is a question of procedure, particularly involving the application of and compliance with Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is axiomatic that where a decision on the merits of a case is rendered and the same has become final and executory, the action on procedural matters or issues becomes moot and academic.[23] | |||||
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2008-03-14 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari cannot be legally used for any other purpose.[53] At most, the petition pertains to an error of judgment, and not of jurisdiction, for clearly under Section 5 of Rule 69, the question of whether a party's interest shall be prejudiced by the division of the real property is left to the determination and discretion of the Commissioners. | |||||
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2007-07-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| This Court has ruled that to disqualify or not to disqualify is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the sense of fairness and justice of the judge concerned.[56] Said discretion is granted to judges, since they are in the better position to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties in their courtrooms.[57] The test that must be applied in questions involving the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial.[58] In this case, we hold that petitioner was not deprived of her day in court, for she was able to file her comments on and/or objections to the motions filed by private respondent. She, therefore, was able to ventilate her positions on the issues brought before the trial court. | |||||
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2004-02-13 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the Agreement. Within thirty days from receipt of the judicial Order approving it on December 20, 1997 payment should have been made, but was not. Thus, nonfulfillment of the terms of the compromise justified execution.[24] It is the height of absurdity for petitioner to attribute to a fortuitous event its delayed payment. Petitioner's explanation is clearly "a gratuitous assertion that borders on callousness."[25] The Christmas season cannot be cited as an act of God that would excuse a delay in the processing of claims by a government entity that is subject to routine accounting and auditing rules. | |||||