This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2012-07-30 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being questioned by petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the case has already been decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the proper reviewing authorities without any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of sentence by the President. The records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was finally confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals,[47] where, in spite of the lapse of more than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he was part of the reason for the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution. The Court held, inter alia: In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition. | |||||
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2009-10-02 |
ABAD, J. |
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| In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's right to speedy trial.[14] This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.[15] This was the main thrust of Cabador's motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court. | |||||
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2008-02-12 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| This case is analogous to Guerrero v. Court of Appeals.[65] There, the Court ruled that there was no violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial and disposition of his case inasmuch as he failed seasonably to assert his rights:In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right a situation amounting to laches had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was re-raffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new Constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right. | |||||
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2005-08-31 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Moreover, respondent's right to a speedy disposition of his case should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice[12] considering that the funds used to acquire the 16 moth-balled oil mills came from the coconut levy funds, which are not only affected with public interest, but are, in fact, prima facie public funds.[13] | |||||
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2004-08-16 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Moreover, respondent's right to a speedy disposition of his case should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice[13] considering that the funds used to acquire the sixteen (16) mothballed oil mills came from the coconut levy funds, which are not only affected with public interest, but are, in fact, prima facie public funds.[14] | |||||
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2003-04-01 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal.[11] If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy[12] or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.[13] | |||||