This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2009-09-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Delay in reporting a crime or identifying the malefactor does not affect the credibility of the witnesses for as long as the same is sufficiently explained.[19] | |||||
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2002-07-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| no avail as appellant was at large.[18] The records likewise show she did not file her sworn declaration against appellant until the latter was in custody.[19] Note that while the incident took place on November 10, 1996, appellant was apprehended only on August 16, 1997.[20] Appellant's allegation that it took Mrs. Bates more than nine months to make a criminal accusation against him before the police is, thus, correct. However, delay in reporting the crime or identifying the malefactors does not affect the credibility of a witness for as long as the delay is sufficiently explained.[21] When the police queried Mrs. Bates why she waited until appellant was arrested before filing her complaint with them, she disclosed that she feared appellant might kill her, too.[22] Fear of reprisal has been accepted by this Court as an adequate explanation for the delay or vacillation in filing criminal charges.[23] The delay in making the criminal accusation having thus been explained, her credibility as a witness remains unimpaired. Fifth, appellant argues that Mrs. Bates' credibility is further put into doubt since her statement that she saw appellant stabbing her son in the chest is contradicted by the autopsy findings that Danilo sustained stab wounds in the trunk. | |||||
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2001-12-03 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In conspiracy, the commission of a crime is through the joint act or intent of two or more persons.[35] To establish conspiracy, however, it is not essential that there be proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime. It is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose or a community of interest.[36] | |||||
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2001-10-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Mere delay in reporting the crime or pinpointing the felons does not affect the credibility of the witnesses for as long as the delay is sufficiently explained.[11] Here, the prosecution established that Lucenda needed time to fully recover from her head injury.[12] Moreover, the police did not go to her and question her during her recovery period.[13] The police only took her sworn statement, on September 6, 1992, or two days before appellant was arrested.[14] Given this background, we find the explanation of her delay in reporting the offense or naming the offender satisfactory. | |||||
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2001-06-20 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Nor could credence be given to the supposed eyewitness testimony of defense witness Emerita Lequigan. Lequigan admitted that she did not tell the police or even the barangay captain that she saw the killing of Roel Sabejon and that she only agreed to testify when Belinda Bacus approached her and asked her to do so.[36] While this Court understands the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in a criminal case,[37] the delay in reporting the crime must be sufficiently explained.[38] In this case, no explanation was given why Emerita Lequigan failed to come forward if she did in fact see the incident which led to the death of Roel Sabejon. Considering that she had known accused-appellant since childhood and it was known in the neighborhood that accused-appellant was arrested for the killing of Roel Sabejon, the Court is at a loss why she failed to inform anyone of her knowledge on the incident in question. The only reasonable explanation is that she did not in fact witness the killing of Roel Sabejon and was only prevailed upon by accused-appellant's common-law spouse and mother to testify in order to help accused-appellant. | |||||
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2001-06-19 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| Neither may accused-appellant invoke the acquittal of the other conspirators to merit the reversal of his conviction. The case of People vs. Arlalejo[22] illustrates that | |||||
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2001-05-24 |
BUENA, J. |
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| The fact that the husband of appellant Paña, one of the alleged conspirators or inducers in the killing, was acquitted of the charges does not put to doubt appellant's culpability. Though conspiracy is a joint act, there is nothing irregular if the supposed co-conspirator is acquitted and others convicted. Generally, conspiracy is only a means by which a crime is committed as the mere act of conspiring is not by itself punishable. Hence, it does not follow that one person alone cannot be convicted when there is conspiracy. As long as the acquittal of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.[24] | |||||