This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2009-04-16 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| As for the alibi of Marcelo, Rogelio and Jovito, for it to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission.[16] That they were in Marcelo's house attending to a relative who was allegedly having difficulty breathing, did not render it impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crimes, the house being a mere 13.5 meters away,[17] more or less. Besides, it is impossible that they could not have noticed the commotion that preceded and attended the incidents. | |||||
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2006-09-27 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Further, the alleged inconsistencies with respect to the presence of appellant's mother in the place where the hacking took place, and the distance between the nipa hut where Ever rested and the area where the hacking took place, are minor inconsistencies and trivial matters that serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of Ever for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Also, they are not material in the instant case since none of them is an essential element of murder.[27] | |||||
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2002-07-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience.[17] Her inability to scream for help was understandable. She was simply shocked into immobility by a violent and tragic tableau that suddenly met her eyes. Fourth, appellant points out that it took Mrs. Bates all of nine months and four days to report the incident to the police and to execute a sworn statement implicating appellant. This unexplained delay damages her credibility, according to appellant, in view of the | |||||
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2001-09-24 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Like treachery, the qualifying circumstance of premeditation must not only be evident but must also be proved with certainty as the crime itself and must be based on external acts indicating deliberate planning.[47] For evident premeditation to be considered, the following facts must be established: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the offense; (2) the commission of an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) the lapse of time between the moment the accused decided to commit the offense and its actual commission, sufficient for the aggressor to reflect on the consequences of his act.[48] | |||||
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2001-09-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| So long as the witnesses' testimonies agree on substantial matters, the inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither the witnesses' credibility nor the verity of their testimonies.[14] When the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime, such inconsistency is insignificant and can not have any bearing on the essential fact testified to, that is the killing of the victim.[15] | |||||
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2000-10-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Positive identification of a culprit is of great weight in determining whether an accused is guilty or not.[24] Our review of the evidence shows that the Galindos did not err in pointing to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. He was well known in their place because he was a "hantak" operator. The defense admitted appellant had long known Gerundino.[25] There was no bad blood between them,[26] and there was no reason for the Galindos to falsely accuse appellant. Furthermore, two other witnesses - -Luminot and Saturnina - - corroborated the testimony concerning appellant's presence at the locus criminis. Appellant as well as his co-accused held a knife, according to Luminot. No ill motive was attributed to these witnesses that could make them falsely testify against appellant. Thus, we find no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's holding that appellant was positively and unequivocally identified as one of the victim's assailants. | |||||
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2000-10-05 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The trial court found the testimony of Eduardo Barte to be "direct, clear cut, straightforward and positive." On the credibility of witnesses, appellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment made by the trial court because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity and credibility of witnesses in the process of unearthing the truth.[2] Unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses must be respected.[3] In the instant case, we agree with the trial court that Eduardo Barte identified accused-appellant as the assailant. His identification was positive, categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive which should prevail over the negative, unsubstantiated, and self-serving evidence of alibi and denial of accused-appellant.[4] | |||||
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2000-09-13 |
PUNO, J. |
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| Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be proved that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission.[53] The accused has failed to adduce such evidence. As borne out by the testimony of defense witness Bermoy, the camp in Cacao where Albacin allegedly spent the New Year's Eve was only about fifteen to twenty-five minutes away from Lasang by jeep. The prosecution witnesses also stated that the distance between Lasang and the camp is about five to eight kilometers. Thus, even if the accused Albacin was seen at the camp on New Year's Eve, it was not physically impossible for him to have gone to Lasang at the time the crimes were committed and gone back to the camp in Cacao. | |||||
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2000-08-15 |
PUNO, J. |
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| alibi.[49] Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission.[50] This, the accused failed to do. As borne out by the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Lorio Gallego's house (where Raul. Gallego supposedly was at the time Wilfredo Lamata was stabbed) was only about three to four kilometers away from the scene of the crime - a distance which by motorcycle could be negotiated in ten minutes. As we have previously ruled in People v. Jose:[51] "Extant in our jurisprudence are cases where the distance between the scene of the crime and the alleged whereabouts of the accused is only two (2) kilometers (People v. Lumantas, 28 SCRA 764 [1969] ), or three (3) kilometers , People v. Binsol, | |||||