This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2014-09-10 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The bottom of the letter contained the handwritten annotation refused to sign, an indication of the refusal to receive and sign for the letter on the part of the petitioner. Such refusal to receive the letter containing the notice for her to explain, coupled with her failure to submit her explanation within the time given in the letter, implied that she waived her right to contest the contents of the letter, thereby forfeiting her right to respond to the charge against her and to rebut the evidence thereon. It further appears that on March 28, 1998 the respondent sent another letter to the petitioner informing her of the termination of her services,[17] but the latter again refused to sign in acknowledgment of the letter. Under the circumstances, the two-notice rule was evidently complied with by the respondent, thereby negating any denial of due process to the petitioner.[18] | |||||
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2012-04-25 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It did so anew in Leonardo v. National Labor Relations Commission[36] on the following rationale: An employer is entitled to impose productivity standards for its workers, and in fact, non-compliance may be visited with a penalty even more severe than demotion. Thus, | |||||
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2006-05-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| As we have held previously, constructive dismissal covers the involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee.[24] | |||||
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2004-09-17 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that Tecson was constructively dismissed when he was transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the company's seminar on new products which were directly competing with similar products manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.[30] None of these conditions are present in the instant case. The record does not show that Tecson was demoted or unduly discriminated upon by reason of such transfer. As found by the appellate court, Glaxo properly exercised its management prerogative in reassigning Tecson to the Butuan City sales area:. . . In this case, petitioner's transfer to another place of assignment was merely in keeping with the policy of the company in avoidance of conflict of interest, and thus valid…Note that [Tecson's] wife holds a sensitive supervisory position as Branch Coordinator in her employer-company which requires her to work in close coordination with District Managers and Medical Representatives. Her duties include monitoring sales of Astra products, conducting sales drives, establishing and furthering relationship with customers, collection, monitoring and managing Astra's inventory…she therefore takes an active participation in the market war characterized as it is by stiff competition among pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, and this is significant, petitioner's sales territory covers Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte while his wife is supervising a branch of her employer in Albay. The proximity of their areas of responsibility, all in the same Bicol Region, renders the conflict of interest not only possible, but actual, as learning by one spouse of the other's market strategies in the region would be inevitable. [Management's] appreciation of a conflict of interest is therefore not merely illusory and wanting in factual basis…[31] | |||||
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2002-09-27 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| We deny the petition. Plainly, the petition raises a fundamentally factual issue, which we are not at liberty to review because our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual questions is the primary and often the final task of lower courts. This Court is not a trier of facts and it is not our function to examine and evaluate all over again the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.[6] We reiterate time and again the much-repeated but not so well-heeded rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, particularly where it is in absolute agreement with that of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, as in this case, are accorded not only respect but even | |||||