This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2015-10-20 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In this jurisdiction, the concept of probation was introduced during the American colonial period.[14] For juvenile delinquents, Act No. 3203[15] was enacted on December 3, 1924. It was later amended by Act Nos. 3309,[16] 3559,[17] and 3725.[18] As to offenders who are eighteen years old and above, Act No. 4221[19] was passed by the legislature and took effect on August 7, 1935. Said Act allowed defendants who are convicted and sentenced by a Court of First Instance or by the Supreme Court on appeal, except those who are convicted of offenses enumerated in Section 8 thereof,[20] to be placed on probation upon application after the sentence has become final and before its service has begun.[21] However, We declared in People v. Vera[22] that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional and void as it constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards. | |||||
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2011-11-23 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Firstly, a contract is the law between the parties. Absent any allegation and proof that the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, it should be complied with in good faith.[43] As such, the petitioner, being one of the parties in the deed of conditional sale, could not be allowed to conveniently renounce the stipulations that she had knowingly and freely agreed to. | |||||
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2009-03-25 |
TINGA, J. |
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| True, the Court of Appeals mentioned in its discussion that Hernandez was a project employee. But the statement appears only in the body of the decision, not in the dispositive portion. Thus, the statement should be considered an obiter dictum at the most.[22] What is enforceable by a writ of execution is the dispositive portion of the decision.[23] | |||||
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2005-12-19 |
TINGA, J. |
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| To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent judge, petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.[75] The Government's contentions against Hon. Gingoyon are severely undercut by the fact that the 21 December 2004 Order, which the 4 January 2005 Order sought to rectify, was indeed severely flawed as it erroneously applied the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, instead of Rep. Act No. 8974, in ascertaining compliance with the requisites for the issuance of the writ of possession. The 4 January 2005 Order, which according to the Government establishes Hon. Gingoyon's bias, was promulgated precisely to correct the previous error by applying the correct provisions of law. It would not speak well of the Court if it sanctions a judge for wanting or even attempting to correct a previous erroneous order which precisely is the right move to take. | |||||
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2005-03-04 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.[31] | |||||