This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2012-10-24 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| The petitioners argue that the foreclosure of their mortgage was premature; that they could not yet be considered in default under the ruling in Almeda v. Court of Appeals,[16] because the trial court was still to determine with certainty the exact amount of their obligation to Metrobank; that they would likely prevail in their action because Metrobank had altered the terms of the loan agreement by increasing the interest rates without their prior assent; and that unless the foreclosure sale was restrained their action would be rendered moot. They urge that despite finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in denying their application for preliminary injunction, the CA should have nonetheless issued a writ of certiorari considering that they had no other plain and speedy remedy. | |||||
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2008-08-13 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month imposed on respondents' loans must be equitably reduced to 1% per month or 12% per annum. [8] We need not unsettle the principle we had affirmed in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% [9] per month and higher [10] are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law. [11] While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, [12] nothing in the said circular could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. [13] | |||||
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2007-02-08 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Petitioners invoke this Court's rulings in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals [10] and Medel vs. Court of Appeals [11] to show that the interest rate in the subject promissory note is unconscionable. Their reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Almeda, what this Court struck down as being unconscionable and excessive was the unilateral increase in the interest rates from 18% to 68%. This Court ruled thus:It is plainly obvious, therefore, from the undisputed facts of the case that respondent bank unilaterally altered the terms of its contract by increasing the interest rates of the loan without the prior assent of the latter. In fact, the manner of agreement is itself explicitly stipulated by the Civil Code when it provides, in Article 1956, that "No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing." What has been "stipulated in writing" from a perusal of the interest rate provision of the credit agreement signed between the parties is that petitioners were bound merely to pay 21% interest x x x. Petitioners also cannot find refuge in Medel. In this case, what this Court declared as unconscionable was the imposition of a 66% interest rate per annum. In the instant case, the interest rate is only 24% per annum, agreed upon by both parties. By no means can it be considered unconscionable or excessive. | |||||
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2007-01-31 |
PUNO, CJ. |
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| It is well-settled that the terms of a contract have the force of law between the parties.[34] As such, the terms thereof shall govern their relationship, rights and obligations in connection with the same. Obligations arising from contracts should be complied with in good faith. Unless the stipulations in the contract are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the same are binding as between the parties.[35] In the instant case, as previously discussed, the Contract to Sell between Spouses Co Chien and private respondents Sta. Lucia and Alsons has all the essential requisites of a valid and binding contract. While there is non-compliance with the requirements in Sections 4 and 5 of P.D. 957 due to the lack of the Certificate and License at the moment of execution, such defect does not affect the intrinsic validity of the contract, particularly in this case wherein the said Certificate and License have been issued prior to the demand for the payment of the balance of the purchase price and the project is almost 100% complete and operational. | |||||
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2005-08-08 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| On the main issue, petitioner contends that The Usury Law[10] has been rendered ineffective by Central Bank Circular No. 905, series of 1982 and accordingly, usury has become legally non-existent in this jurisdiction, thus, interest rates may accordingly be pegged at such levels or rates as the lender and the borrower may agree upon. Petitioner avers she has not violated any law considering she is not engaged in the business of money-lending. Moreover, she claims she has suffered inconveniences and incurred expenses for some 13 years now as a result of respondents' failure to pay her. Petitioner further points out that the 5% interest rate was proposed by the respondents and have only themselves to blame if the interests and penalties ballooned to its present amount due to their willful delay and default in payment. The appellate court thus erred, petitioner now insists, in applying Sps. Almeda v. Court of Appeals[11] and Medel v. Court of Appeals[12] to reduce the interest rate to 12% per annum and the penalty to 1% per month. | |||||
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2005-07-08 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| On the main issue, petitioner contends that The Usury Law[10] has been rendered ineffective by Central Bank Circular No. 905, series of 1982 and accordingly, usury has become legally non-existent in this jurisdiction, thus, interest rates may accordingly be pegged at such levels or rates as the lender and the borrower may agree upon. Petitioner avers she has not violated any law considering she is not engaged in the business of money-lending. Moreover, she claims she has suffered inconveniences and incurred expenses for some 13 years now as a result of respondents' failure to pay her. Petitioner further points out that the 5% interest rate was proposed by the respondents and have only themselves to blame if the interests and penalties ballooned to its present amount due to their willful delay and default in payment. The appellate court thus erred, petitioner now insists, in applying Sps. Almeda v. Court of Appeals[11] and Medel v. Court of Appeals[12] to reduce the interest rate to 12% per annum and the penalty to 1% per month. | |||||