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PEOPLE v. EMILIO SANTOS V DELGADO

This case has been cited 2 times or more.

2003-09-30
QUISUMBING, J.
According to the OSG, for the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to apply, the vindication must be "immediate." This view is not entirely accurate. The word "immediate" in the English text is not the correct translation of the controlling Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, which uses the word "proxima."[109]  The Spanish text, on this point, allows a lapse of time between the grave offense and the actual vindication.[110]  Thus, in an earlier case involving the infidelity of a wife, the killing of her paramour prompted proximately though not immediately by the desire to avenge the wrong done, was considered an extenuating circumstance in favor of the accused.[111] The time elapsed between the offense and the suspected cause for vindication, however, involved only hours and minutes, not days.  Hence, we agree with the Solicitor General that the lapse of two (2) weeks between his discovery of his wife's infidelity and the killing of her supposed paramour could no longer be considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight is more than sufficient time for appellant to have recovered his composure and assuaged the unease in his mind. The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity.[112]  Thus, in this case, we hold that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be considered in appellant's favor.
2000-10-11
BELLOSILLO, J.
Having invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, accused-appellant Joaquin Barrameda is deemed to have admitted having killed the victim and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish and prove the elements to set up the defense,[7] namely, (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and, (c) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one defending himself had no part therein.[8] In the case at bar, accused-appellant Joaquin Barrameda failed to present sufficient proof of the existence of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the deceased. Except for his self-serving and uncorroborated allegations, there is nothing on record that would justify his killing of Ruperto. He even failed to present his wife to corroborate his claim of sexual assault upon her by the deceased. Hence, the plea of defense of a relative cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also extremely doubtful in itself.[9] The records show the presence of eight (8) stab, hack and incised wounds on the head and body of the deceased. If accused-appellant Barrameda stabbed the deceased merely to defend his wife, it certainly defies reason why he had to inflict several stab and hack wounds on the victim. The rule is settled that the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted on the victim negate an accused's defense of oneself or of a relative or a stranger.[10]