This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2005-08-22 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Anent respondent Arnaiz's negligence in driving his car, both the trial court and the CA agreed that it was only contributory, and considered the same in mitigating the award of damages in his favor as provided under Article 2179[42] of the New Civil Code. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.[43] Even the petitioner itself described Arnaiz's negligence as contributory. In its Answer to the complaint filed with the trial court, the petitioner asserted that "the direct and proximate cause of the accident was the gross negligence of PASUDECO personnel which resulted in the spillage of sugarcane and the apparent failure of the PASUDECO workers to clear and mop up the area completely, coupled with the contributory negligence of Arnaiz in driving his car at an unreasonable speed."[44] However, the petitioner changed its theory in the present recourse, and now claims that the proximate and immediate cause of the mishap in question was the reckless imprudence or gross negligence of respondent Arnaiz.[45] Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. When a party adopts a certain theory in the trial court, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[46] | |||||
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2001-12-10 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| However, we differ with petitioner on the second issue. Recall that before Petrophil terminated the contract on May 25, 1987, there was a strike of its employees at the Pandacan terminal. Dr. Cruz and her husband were seen at the picket line and were reported to have instructed their truck drivers not to load petroleum products. At the resumption of the operation in Pandacan terminal, Dr. Cruz's contract was suspended for one week and eventually terminated. Based on these circumstances, the Court of Appeals like the trial court concluded that Petrophil terminated the contract because of Dr. Cruz's refusal to load petroleum products during the strike. In respondent court's view, the termination appeared as a retaliation or punishment for her sympathizing with the striking employees. Nowhere in the record do we find that petitioner asked her to explain her actions. Petrophil simply terminated her contract. These factual findings are binding and conclusive on us, especially in the absence of any allegation that said findings are unsupported by the evidence, or that the appellate and trial courts misapprehended these facts.[16] In terminating the hauling contract of Dr. Cruz without hearing her side on the factual context above described, petitioner opened itself to a charge of bad faith. While Petrophil had the right to terminate the contract, petitioner could not act purposely to injure private respondents. In BPI Express Card Corporation vs. CA, 296 SCRA 260, 272 (1998), we held that there is abuse of a right under Article 19 if the following elements are present: 1) there is a legal right or duty; 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. We find all these three elements present in the instant case. Hence, we are convinced that the termination by petitioner of the contract with Dr. Cruz calls for appropriate sanctions by way of damages. | |||||