This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2001-11-22 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Well-enshrined in jurisprudence is the principle that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court,[11] unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[12] This is because the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of credibility since he has personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.[13] While it is true that the defense presented three witnesses who swore that it was a different person who committed the crime, the trial court disbelieved their testimonies on substantial grounds. For one, the records show that defense witnesses Ayuban and Reyes did not actually see the shooting. They merely saw a Roy Velos, running away from the scene of the crime, as opposed to the two prosecution witnesses who were right beside the victim when he was gunned down and who actually saw appellant shoot the victim. Strangely, Ayuban, De los Reyes and Reyes got a look at Velos' face because as he was passing them, the cover of his face (a handkerchief according to Ayuban, a towel according to delos Reyes and a jacket according to Reyes) dropped or moved and conveniently unmasked appellant's face. | |||||
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2001-03-27 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| We have repeatedly held that we will not interfere with the trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record some circumstance of weight and influence which had been overlooked or the significance of which had been misinterpreted by the trial court.[27] Indeed, one of the recognized exceptions to the rule is when the judge who penned the decision is not the judge who received the evidence and heard the witnesses.[28] Hence, we took pains to meticulously examine the records and review the evidence in this case. | |||||
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2000-07-14 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| Zenaida was thus able to observe how her husband was shot at a distance of thirty (30) meters with only the light from the gas lamp aiding her vision. She testified that as soon as the malefactors had taken her husband to a distance of around thirty meters from their house, appellant shot him and appellant's companions followed suit. No one of the three malefactors, most especially appellant, even tried to dissuade his companions from committing the crime. Zenaida's unrebutted testimony, consequently, proves beyond a shadow of doubt that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, all the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[56] Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident.[57] | |||||