This case has been cited 22 times or more.
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2016-01-12 |
BRION, J. |
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| Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward's out-of-court identification to be reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when the three individuals entered Edward's office, they initially pretended -to be customers,[32] and even asked about the products that were for sale.[33] The three had told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino "pulled out a gun" instead.[34] After Pepino's companion had taken the money from the cashier's box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go down to the parked car. From this sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for Edward - before and after the gun had been pointed at him -to view the faces of the three persons who entered his office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino had talked to him "[a]t least once a day"[35] during the four days that he was detained. | |||||
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2016-01-12 |
BRION, J. |
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| Another circumstance that is evaluated is the length of time between the crime and the identification. People's memories tend to fade through time.[69] It is ideal that prosecution witnesses identify the suspect immediately after the crime. An identification made two (2) days after the criminal incident is found to be acceptable.[70] This court found that a corporeal identification made five and a half months might not be as reliable.[71] | |||||
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2016-01-12 |
BRION, J. |
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| Teehankee, Jr. introduced the totality of circumstances test as the standard for evaluating out-of-court testimonies because this court recognized that "con-uption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification[.]"[134] In Gamer, the witness' identification failed on the first level since the conditions at that time did not grant the witness ample opportunity to observe and remember the appearance of the accused. Hence, this court stated that "the in-court identification of the appellant. . . could have been tainted by the out-of-court (police line-up) procedure[.]"[135] | |||||
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2016-01-12 |
BRION, J. |
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| First, courts must determine whether the police officers or NBI agents prevent members of the press from photographing or videotaping suspects before witness identification. Undue influence may be present if there is evidence that the witnesses were able to view the visual press coverage prior to identification.[150] | |||||
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2012-08-29 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Yet, the Pereñas submit that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity was speculative and unfounded. They cited People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[37] where the Court deleted the indemnity for victim Jussi Leino's loss of earning capacity as a pilot for being speculative due to his having graduated from high school at the International School in Manila only two years before the shooting, and was at the time of the shooting only enrolled in the first semester at the Manila Aero Club to pursue his ambition to become a professional pilot. That meant, according to the Court, that he was for all intents and purposes only a high school graduate. | |||||
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2012-04-11 |
SERENO, J. |
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| AAA's testimony is consistent with human experience. We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants.[74] Furthermore, victims to a crime are generally capable of remembering the identity of the criminal with a high degree of reliability because of the bestial acts that happen before their eyes.[75] This especially finds application in the case at bar, where the victim was in possession of her faculties at the time of the incident and was not shown to be under the influence of alcohol or similar substances. | |||||
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2011-06-14 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of circumstances" test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada v. Desierto,[25] that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. | |||||
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2010-09-07 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Upon reaching the area at 8:45 a.m., they saw several onlookers around and near a black Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777 on a stop position in the middle lane of Katipunan Avenue facing south going to Libis. They found the victim's bloodied and bullet-riddled body partly slumped onto the pavement at the car's left door, which was open. The front windshield and sliding glass windows on the left and right side were shattered; a hole was seen on the glass window of the left rear door, apparently pierced by a bullet. Glass splinters were scattered inside the car and on the pavement at both sides of the car. On orders of Chief Insp. Villena, PO2 Daganta and PO1 Francisco assisted by a certain Cesar Espiritu, immediately brought the victim to the Quirino Memorial Hospital in Project 4, Quezon City. SPO2 Magundacan was instructed to stay behind to cordon the area for the start of the investigation while Chief Insp. Villena went to their station to get his camera.[5] After ten (10) minutes, Chief Insp. Villena returned and took pictures of the crime scene, and also of the victim at the hospital.[6] SPO2 Magundacan was able to pick up several spent shells and two (2) slugs, apparently fired from .45 and 9 mm. pistols.[7] A sketch was prepared by PO2 Daganta who also interviewed some of the witnesses present at the crime scene.[8] The spot report and list of recovered items (including a Philippine Military Academy gold ring on which was engraved the name "Rolando N. Abadilla") were later prepared by SPO2 Magundacan at the police station.[9] | |||||
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2010-09-07 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| Upon reaching the area at 8:45 a.m., they saw several onlookers around and near a black Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777 on a stop position in the middle lane of Katipunan Avenue facing south going to Libis. They found the victim's bloodied and bullet-riddled body partly slumped onto the pavement at the car's left door, which was open. The front windshield and sliding glass windows on the left and right side were shattered; a hole was seen on the glass window of the left rear door, apparently pierced by a bullet. Glass splinters were scattered inside the car and on the pavement at both sides of the car. On orders of Chief Insp. Villena, PO2 Daganta and PO1 Francisco assisted by a certain Cesar Espiritu, immediately brought the victim to the Quirino Memorial Hospital in Project 4, Quezon City. SPO2 Magundacan was instructed to stay behind to cordon the area for the start of the investigation while Chief Insp. Villena went to their station to get his camera.[5] After ten (10) minutes, Chief Insp. Villena returned and took pictures of the crime scene, and also of the victim at the hospital.[6] SPO2 Magundacan was able to pick up several spent shells and two (2) slugs, apparently fired from .45 and 9 mm. pistols.[7] A sketch was prepared by PO2 Daganta who also interviewed some of the witnesses present at the crime scene.[8] The spot report and list of recovered items (including a Philippine Military Academy gold ring on which was engraved the name "Rolando N. Abadilla") were later prepared by SPO2 Magundacan at the police station.[9] | |||||
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2010-05-04 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[33] we explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification. We said: Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. | |||||
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2009-10-09 |
BRION, J. |
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| While the appellant tested negative for gunpowder nitrates, Forensic Chemist Salinas testified that a paraffin test is not conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun. This view is fully in accord with past findings and observations of this Court that paraffin tests, in general, are inconclusive; the negative findings in paraffin tests do not conclusively show that a person did not discharge a firearm.[48] Our ruling in People v. Teehankee, Jr.[49] on this point is particularly instructive: Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has "... proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco." In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. x x x x [Emphasis ours] | |||||
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2009-09-11 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The Court, in a long line of cases,[8] has reiterated the totality of circumstance test set forth in People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[9] which dictates that the following factors be considered in determining the reliability of the out-of-court identification made by a witness, i.e., (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at the time of the crime; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. | |||||
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2009-02-12 |
BRION, J. |
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| In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[38] we explained the procedure for out-of- court identification and the test to determine its admissibility:Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Rudy's out-of-court identification to be reliable and thus admissible. First, Rudy testified that the tricycle he was riding passed "very near" the place where the victim was stabbed, and that the park at that time was "very bright." Second, Rudy was simply riding a tricycle when the stabbing, a very startling incident, happened; no competing incident took place to draw his attention away from the incident; and the event, being startling, consumed his full attention and gave him the chance to see clearly the features of the person stabbed, the manner he was stabbed, and the appearance of the assailants. Third, he stated with certainty that he could identify the assailants' faces when he reported the incident to barangay tanod Cesar. Fourth, the identification took place within two (2) days from the stabbing incident; he explained fully why it took him two days to come forward and report the stabbing. Finally, there was nothing "suggestive" or irregular about Rudy's out-of-court identification of the appellants; it was not even a show-up - as Rizaldy suggests where the suspects, tagged as the persons to be identified, are brought face-to-face with the witness for confirmation of identification. When Rudy arrived at the police station, he was asked to point to the assailants from among the many prisoners inside the cell; he was not compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. There was also no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to Rudy that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators. Thus, Rudy's identification was spontaneous, independent, and untainted by any improper suggestion. | |||||
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2008-10-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has "x x x proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco." In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. x x x.[39] | |||||
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2008-09-11 |
BRION, J. |
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| The aspect of this case that remains unexplored, despite the availability of supporting evidence, is Rosita's out-of-court identification of Rodrigo, done for the first time through a lone photograph shown to her at the police station, and subsequently, by personal confrontation at the same police station at an undisclosed time (presumably, soon after Rodrigo's arrest). Jurisprudence has acknowledged that out-of-court identification of an accused through photographs or mug shots is one of the established procedures in pinning down criminals.[29] Other procedures for out-of-court identifications may be conducted through show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness (a procedure that appears to have been done in the present case as admitted by Rosita[30] and noted in the decision[31]), or through line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose.[32] | |||||
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2005-06-15 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Although the term "DNA testing" was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[33] it was only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Court of Appeals[34] that more than a passing mention was given to DNA analysis. In Tijing, we issued a writ of habeas corpus against respondent who abducted petitioners' youngest son. Testimonial and documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to establish parentage. However, we observed that:Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues. | |||||
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2004-05-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In resolving the admissibility of out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the perpetrator of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at the time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty shown by the witness of his identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. [22] | |||||
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2004-01-21 |
PER CURIAM |
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| The reliance by appellant Cachola on People v. Teehankee[26] is misplaced. In that case the negative result of the paraffin test did not preclude a finding of guilt by the trial court, the reason being that the accused was tested for the presence of nitrates only after more than 72 hours had lapsed from the time of the shooting. In the present case, the paraffin test was conducted on the same night the shooting incident occurred; hence, the lapse of only a few hours increases its reliability. While the presence of nitrates on accused's hand is not conclusive of guilt, it bolsters the testimony of an eyewitness that the accused fired a gun. | |||||
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2003-12-02 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The value of the in-court identification made by Lydia, however, is largely dependent upon the out-of-court identification she made while appellant was in the custody of the police. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[19] this Court held that corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case. | |||||
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2000-12-04 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| From the circumstances of this case, it cannot be denied that complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit had a good look at the face and physical features of accused-appellant during the commission of the crime. While the robbery was in progress, the moonlight sufficiently illumined his face and clothes, thus making it possible for private complainant to identify him.[16] During the rape, private complainant was as close to accused-appellant as was physically possible, for a man and a woman cannot be more physically close to each other than during a sexual act.[17] Victims of criminal violence naturally strive to know the identity of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was perpetrated, creating a lasting impression which may not be erased easily in their memory.[18] There is therefore no reason to doubt the accuracy of private complainant's visual perception of accused-appellant as the criminal. Nor is there any reason to doubt her honesty of intention for there is no showing that she implicated accused-appellant due to an evil or corrupt motive. | |||||