Lawyerly

GR No. 207900

2014-04-22

PERALTA, J.

For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] under Rule 65, which petitioner Gamal S. Hayudini (Hayudini) filed to set aside and annul the assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), dated June 20, 2013[2] and July 10, 2013,[3] which cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy for the mayoralty seat in the 2013 local elections in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

GR No. 207900

2014-04-22

MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC

PERALTA, J.

The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he or she is running.[30] Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.[31]

GR No. 207900

2014-04-22

MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC

PERALTA, J.

Hayudini likewise protests that it was a grave error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared his proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment of his proclamation was ever filed. What petitioner seems to miss, however, is that the nullification of his proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome - a necessary legal consequence - of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.[35] The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes.[36] If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office.[37] The only exception to this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial candidates where the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also assumed office.[38]

GR No. 207264

2013-10-22

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMELEC

PEREZ, J.

xxx Instead, the PES immediately declared the resumption of the proceedings of the PBOC and instructed the Board Secretary to immediately read its Order proclaiming Regina Ongsiako Reyes as winner for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of Marinduque.[20]

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible[22] should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes.[23] If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.[27]

GR No. 195229

2012-10-09

EFREN RACEL ARATEA v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office." The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate's freedom of choice,[29] is found both in the Constitution[30] and the law.[31] After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election[32] because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"[33] means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.

GR No. 187478

2009-12-21

REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

The HRET avers that this Court had explained the importance of property ownership in Aquino v. COMELEC, et al.[31] and finds no merit in petitioner's insistence that the will of the electorate attests to his residence in Sta. Rosa because, the HRET further avers, "[a] disqualified candidate cannot assume office."[32]

GR No. 180088

2009-01-19

MANUEL B. JAPZON v. COMELEC

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.

GR No. 179695

2008-12-18

MIKE A. FERMIN v. COMELEC

NACHURA, J.

We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7[52] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,[53] contrary to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing "Section 78" petitions. While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates[54] (retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections[55] explains that "the `procedure hereinabove provided' mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of disqualification cases, [but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates x x x."), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing "Section 78" petitions under the OEC is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of CoCs. The clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by the mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.[56] In addition, it is noteworthy that Loong,[57] which upheld the 25-day period for filing "Section 78" petitions, was decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states:Sec. 2. Period to File Petition.--The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy.

GR Nos. 163619-20

2005-11-17

IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA v. CARLOS BOADO

CARPIO, J.

Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April 2003 showing her acquisition of a parcel of land in San Julian West where she eventually built a house. However, property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be voted for an office.[17] Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost.[18] To successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

GR Nos. 154796-97

2003-10-23

RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argues that the people's choice expressed in the local elections deserves respect. Bautista's invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws is unavailing. As held in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:[45]

GR No. 142907

2000-11-29

JOSE EMMANUEL L. CARLOS v. ADORACION G. ANGELES

PARDO, J.

In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote"[19] through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate.[20] "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people."[21] "Specifically, the term `election', in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes."[22] The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election.[23] "Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election."[24] In case of protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for the candidates decides the election protest case. The candidate receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall be proclaimed the winner. Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer, can not be declared elected.[25] "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected."[26] In other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."[27]

	GR No. 207900 2014-04-22	MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
For the Court's resolution is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] under Rule 65, which petitioner Gamal S. Hayudini (Hayudini) filed to set aside and annul the assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), dated June 20, 2013[2] and July 10, 2013,[3] which cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy for the mayoralty seat in the 2013 local elections in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
	GR No. 207900 2014-04-22	MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he or she is running.[30] Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.[31]
	GR No. 207900 2014-04-22	MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
Hayudini likewise protests that it was a grave error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared his proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment of his proclamation was ever filed. What petitioner seems to miss, however, is that the nullification of his proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome - a necessary legal consequence - of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.[35] The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled as stray votes.[36] If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner. Meanwhile, the candidate may be voted for and even be proclaimed as the winner, but the COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise applies even if the candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office.[37] The only exception to this rule is in the case of congressional and senatorial candidates where the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favor of either the Senate or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken the proper oath, and also assumed office.[38]
	GR No. 207264 2013-10-22	REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMELEC PEREZ, J.
xxx Instead, the PES immediately declared the resumption of the proceedings of the PBOC and instructed the Board Secretary to immediately read its Order proclaiming Regina Ongsiako Reyes as winner for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of Marinduque.[20]
	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible[22] should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes.[23] If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.
	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.[27]
	GR No. 195229 2012-10-09	EFREN RACEL ARATEA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office." The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorate's freedom of choice,[29] is found both in the Constitution[30] and the law.[31] After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election[32] because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible"[33] means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office.
	GR No. 187478 2009-12-21	REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The HRET avers that this Court had explained the importance of property ownership in Aquino v. COMELEC, et al.[31] and finds no merit in petitioner's insistence that the will of the electorate attests to his residence in Sta. Rosa because, the HRET further avers, "[a] disqualified candidate cannot assume office."[32]
	GR No. 180088 2009-01-19	MANUEL B. JAPZON v. COMELEC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,[25] the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
	GR No. 179695 2008-12-18	MIKE A. FERMIN v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7[52] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,[53] contrary to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the period for filing "Section 78" petitions. While Section 7 of the said law makes reference to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the CoCs of nuisance candidates[54] (retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections[55] explains that "the `procedure hereinabove provided' mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6 which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of disqualification cases, [but] can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates x x x."), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing "Section 78" petitions under the OEC is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the filing of CoCs. The clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or modified by the mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.[56] In addition, it is noteworthy that Loong,[57] which upheld the 25-day period for filing "Section 78" petitions, was decided long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we therefore find as contrary to the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states:Sec. 2. Period to File Petition.--The petition must be filed within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy.
	GR Nos. 163619-20 2005-11-17	IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA v. CARLOS BOADO CARPIO, J.
Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April 2003 showing her acquisition of a parcel of land in San Julian West where she eventually built a house. However, property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be voted for an office.[17] Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost.[18] To successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
	GR Nos. 154796-97 2003-10-23	RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argues that the people's choice expressed in the local elections deserves respect. Bautista's invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws is unavailing. As held in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:[45]
	GR No. 142907 2000-11-29	JOSE EMMANUEL L. CARLOS v. ADORACION G. ANGELES PARDO, J.
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote"[19] through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate.[20] "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people."[21] "Specifically, the term `election', in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes."[22] The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election.[23] "Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election."[24] In case of protest, a revision or recount of the ballots cast for the candidates decides the election protest case. The candidate receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall be proclaimed the winner. Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is ineligible or disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes or the second placer, can not be declared elected.[25] "The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected."[26] In other words, "a defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."[27]

AGAPITO A. AQUINO v. COMELEC