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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. CA

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

2012-07-25
SERENO, J.
Section 10(c), Rule 39 must be read in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which requires that service of pleadings or papers must be made on the counsel if a party is already represented by one. It is a settled rule that notice to the client will only be binding and effective if specifically ordered by the Court. Notice to the client and not to the counsel of record is not notice within the meaning of the law.[16] Consequently, contrary to the recommendation of the OCA that service of the Notice to Vacate on the defendants themselves substantially complied with the essence and spirit of Rule 39, Section 10(c), the sheriff should have served the notice on the defendants' counsel of record and not on the defendants directly.
2009-06-16
PUNO, C.J.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure.[24] Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.[25]
2009-02-13
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Nonetheless, we have held that a delay in the filing of an appeal under exceptional circumstances may be excused on grounds of substantial justice and equity.[22] Filing of an appeal beyond the reglementary period may, under meritorious cases, be excused if the barring of the appeal would be inequitable and unjust in light of certain circumstances therein.[23] Courts may suspend its own rules, or except a particular case from its operations, whenever the purposes of justice require it.[24] In Baylon v. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau,[25] we laid down the range of reasons which may provide justification for a court to resist strict adherence to procedure, to wit: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor and property; (2) counsel's negligence without the participatory negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (7) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
2008-09-25
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It has been said time and again that the perfection of an appeal within the period fixed by the rules is mandatory and jurisdictional.[35] But it is always in the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it.[36] This Court is mindful of the policy of affording litigants the amplest opportunity for the determination of their cases on the merits[37] and of dispensing with technicalities whenever compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.[38]
2004-11-25
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
In Philippine National Bank, et al. v. Court of Appeals,[26] we allowed, in the higher interest of justice, an appeal filed three days late.
2001-10-18
BELLOSILLO, J.
Petitioner assails the 18 February 1998 Resolution denying his Motion for  Reconsideration, asserting that the Court of Appeals should not have denied his motion on mere technicality.  Petitioner claims that his counsel was not notified of the Court of Appeals' decision.  The Notice of Judgment[16] of the decision of the Court of Appeals shows that the same was served on petitioner Gregorio de Vera himself and not on his counsel.  Petitioner asserts that service to a party is allowed only if the party is not represented by counsel.  But if he is represented by a counsel, then service shall be made upon his counsel unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.  Unless so ordered, service on the party himself who is represented by counsel is not notice in law, hence, invalid.[17]