This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2012-07-18 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| We start our analysis by applying the principle of Jura Regalia or the Regalian Doctrine.[33] Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles.[34] Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those acquired from native title,[35] must be traced from some grant, whether express or implied, from the State.[36] Absent a clear showing that land had been let into private ownership through the State's imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State.[37] | |||||
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2008-10-08 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.[123] | |||||
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2003-01-28 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be avoided.[24] But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.[25] In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules.[26] This the petitioner failed to do when she did not submit her memorandum of appeal in Civil Case No. 12044 as required by Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. That she lost her case is not the trial court's fault but her own. | |||||
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2001-10-17 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Moreover, the disputed parcels are registered lands under the Torrens System. Under this system, registration is the operative act, which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. As Act No. 496 clearly provides in Section 50, "registration is the operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned". As early as Villasor v. Camon, 89 Phil. 404 (1951), we held that it is the act of registration with the Register of Deeds which validates dealings with properties registered under the Torrens System. This rule was affirmed recently in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88 (1994) and in Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 79 (1996). The only exception made in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 780, 789 (1990), is a situation where a party has actual knowledge of the claimant's actual, open, and notorious possession of the disputed property at the time that the levy or attachment was registered. In such a situation, the actual notice and knowledge is equivalent to registration, because to hold otherwise would be to tolerate fraud and the Torrens System cannot be used to shield fraud.[7] | |||||