This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2013-10-22 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Ganzon's acts met the criteria in Largo v. Court of Appeals. To begin with, he was not acting in a private capacity when he acted menacingly towards Arlos, it being clear that his resentment of his poor performance rating, surely a matter that concerned his performance of duty, motivated his confronting the latter. Moreover, it did not matter that his acts were committed outside of office hours, because they were intimately connected to the office of the offender. An act is intimately connected to the office of the offender if it is committed as the consequence of the performance of the office by him, or if it cannot exist without the office even if public office is not an element of the crime in the abstract. This was the thrust in Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[19] with the Court citing ample jurisprudence.[20] | |||||
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2010-09-15 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused's] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x"[21] | |||||
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2009-08-25 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused's] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x[20] | |||||
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2003-09-16 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| An offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the accused's office when such office is an element of the crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official function of the accused.[62] In Cunanan vs. Arceo,[63] we held:"In Sanchez vs. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term `offense committed in relation to [an accused's] office' by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla vs. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People vs. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla vs. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused's office if `the offense cannot exist without the office' such that `the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x.' In People vs. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that `although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,' the facts in a particular case may show that `x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused's] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. . . .'" | |||||