This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2015-02-11 |
LEONEN, J. |
||||
| A question of fact exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts."[37] On the other hand, a question of law exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts."[38] | |||||
|
2009-06-18 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| The appellate court granted the petitions on the following grounds: First, petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration was a prohibited pleading which Judge Mariano should not have taken cognizance of. It was a second motion for reconsideration with regard to the dismissal of the criminal charge for estafa under Article 315(1)(b) against Joson. Second, there was no sufficient evidence to warrant Joson's indictment since petitioner failed to show that she participated in the alleged conversion of the LTCPs and conspired with the other respondents in committing the same. Third, the Supreme Court ruled in Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals[15] that a money market transaction partakes of a nature of a loan and therefore, the non-payment thereof would not give rise to criminal liability for estafa through misappropriation or conversion.[16] East Asia did not receive money in trust, or on commission or for administration, or under any other obligation to make delivery of or to return the same. It did not become a trustee of petitioner, nor was any fiduciary relationship created. Thus, the appellate court ordered the dismissal of the criminal charge for estafa under Article 315(1)(b) against respondents for lack of probable cause:ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the instant consolidated petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 81518 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81526) is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed ORDERS dated 26 May 2003, 25 September 2003 and 29 December 2003, issued by public respondent are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Order dated 13 December 2002 is hereby REINSTATED. | |||||
|
2006-09-11 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| The issue in this case concerns attorney's fees in the ordinary concept. Generally, the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer's compensation. In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the reasonable worth of the attorney's services. Courts may ascertain also if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances.[18] In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's fees; agreement as to fees.- An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject - matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. (Underscoring supplied.) We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney's fees as follows: (1) the amount and character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; and (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.[19] | |||||
|
2006-08-23 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of attorneys' fees cannot be denied. Lawyers are officers of the Court and they participate in the fundamental function of administering justice.[14] When they took their oath, they submitted themselves to the authority of the Court and subjected their professional fees to judicial control. [15] | |||||