This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2015-01-14 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| For Article 1191 to be applicable, however, there must be reciprocal prestations as distinguished from mutual obligations between or among the parties. A prestation is the object of an obligation, and it is the conduct required by the parties to do or not to do, or to give.[177] Parties may be mutually obligated to each other, but the prestations of these obligations are not necessarily reciprocal. The reciprocal prestations must necessarily emanate from the same cause that gave rise to the existence of the contract. This distinction is best illustrated by an established authority in civil law, the late Arturo Tolentino: This article applies only to reciprocal obligations. It has no application to every case where two persons are mutually debtor and creditor of each other. There must be reciprocity between them. Both relations must arise from the same cause, such that one obligation is correlative to the other. Thus, a person may be the debtor of another by reason of an agency, and his creditor by reason of a loan. They are mutually obligated, but the obligations are not reciprocal. Reciprocity arises from identity of cause, and necessarily the two obligations are created at the same time.[178] (Citation omitted) | |||||
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2015-01-14 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| Ang Yu Asuncion v. Court of Appeals[179] provides a clear necessity of the cause in perfecting the existence of an obligation: An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156, Civil Code). The obligation is constituted upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz: (a) The vinculum juris or juridical tie which is the efficient cause established by the various sources of obligations (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b) the object which is the prestation or conduct, required to be observed (to give, to do or not to do); and (c) the subject-persons who, viewed from the demandability of the obligation, are the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor) subjects.[180] | |||||
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2012-01-18 |
ABAD, J. |
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| Three elements are needed to create a perfected contract: 1) the consent of the contracting parties; (2) an object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) the cause of the obligation which is established.[6] Under the law on sales, a contract of sale is perfected when the seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to the buyer, over which the latter agrees.[7] From that moment, the parties may demand reciprocal performance. | |||||
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2010-12-08 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| On the other hand, in Ang Yu Asuncion v. Court of Appeals,[20] an elucidation on the "right of first refusal" was made thus: In the law on sales, the so-called `right of first refusal' is an innovative juridical relation. Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Neither can the right of first refusal, understood in its normal concept, per se be brought within the purview of an option under the second paragraph of Article 1479, aforequoted, or possibly of an offer under Article 1319 of the same Code. An option or an offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however, would be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct. | |||||
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2004-11-19 |
TINGA, J, |
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| In a right of first refusal, on the other hand, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right would be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that are yet to be firmed up.[45] | |||||
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2001-11-14 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Our attention is invited by petitioners to Ang Yu Asuncion v. CA[41] in concluding that if our holding in Ang Yu would be applied to the facts of this case then FIRESTONE's "option, if still subsisting, is not enforceable," the option being merely a preparatory contract which cannot be enforced. | |||||