This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2009-06-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The above provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at the appellant and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy to ensure that the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is in consonance with the earlier ruling[33] of this Court that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. In the instant case, the judge of the trial court merely exercised his judicial discretion when he denied petitioner's motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the CA was correct when it found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion in issuing the challenged orders. | |||||
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2009-06-05 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Petitioner has put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in court, including the suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice, is in consonance with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, [34] Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, [35] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[36] Dimatulac v. Villon,[37] and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[38] | |||||
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2009-04-07 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Also significant is Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,[17] in which this Court ruled that although it is more prudent to wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from the Secretary of Justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw an Information, a trial court, nonetheless, should make its own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of the Secretary. The trial court has the option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused, and whether after reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary who reviewed the records of the investigation, provided that such grant or denial is made from its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion. | |||||
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2008-07-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,[54] this Court ruled that, although it is more prudent to wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from the secretary of justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw an information, a trial court nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of the secretary. The trial court has the option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused, and whether after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the secretary who reviewed the records of the investigation, provided that such grant or denial is made from its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion. | |||||
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2007-02-19 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner likewise invokes Marcelo v. Court of Appeals[7] where this Court declared:Nothing in the said ruling forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases. The Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain as far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. The Court is unconvinced. | |||||
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2005-10-20 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The private respondent, on May 27, 2002, received a copy of Resolution No. 258 of the Secretary of Justice downgrading the charges from murder and attempted murder to homicide and attempted homicide. She had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution on or before June 6, 2002. Indeed, she filed such motion, through the private prosecutors, by personal delivery to the DOJ on June 4, 2002. Thereafter, it behooved the RTC to suspend the proceedings until after the Secretary of Justice had resolved such motion with finality, including the consideration of the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor for the admission of the Second Amended Information for homicide, the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 926, and the arraignment of the petitioners for homicide. It was, in fact, premature for the Provincial Prosecutor to file such motion for the admission of the Second Amended Information since the Secretary of Justice had not yet resolved the said motion; after all, he may still reconsider Resolution No. 258, which he did on November 18, 2002, effectively reversing his previous ruling affirming the assailed Resolutions of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 26, 2001 and July 26, 2001, and thus reverting to the original charges of murder and attempted murder. As this Court declared in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals:[32] | |||||