This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2008-11-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| It is not the province of the Court to delve into the wisdom of legislative enactments. The only function of courts is the interpretation of laws. The principle of separation of powers prevents them from reinventing laws.[140] By the very nature of the function of the Legislature, it is that branch of government that is vested with being the judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of any law.[141] Courts are bereft of any power to take away the prerogatives of the legislature in the guise of construing or interpreting the law.[142] In making choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes, are not addressed to the judiciary. They may be addressed only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive, to which courts have no business of prying into. Whichever way the legislative and executive branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and their constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not the courts of justice.[143] | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws.[38] The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.[39] | |||||
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2004-09-29 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid.[42] The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state.[43] In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.[44] In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,[45] ruled that: "The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. 'Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.' This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it." Respondents have an ingenious retort against the above disquisition. Their theory is that the regulatory power of the LGUs is granted by R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), a handiwork of the national lawmaking authority. They contend that R.A. No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205 (issued by President Aquino). Respondents' argument espouses a bad precedent. To say that LGUs exercise the same regulatory power over matters which are peculiarly within the NTC's competence is to promote a scenario of LGUs and the NTC locked in constant clash over the appropriate regulatory measure on the same subject matter. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC. | |||||