Lawyerly

You're currently signed in as:
User

SPS. EDUARDO VACA AND MA. LUISITA PILAR v. CA

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 172504 2013-07-31	DONNA C. NAGTALON v. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK BRION, J.
The CA held that equitable and peculiar circumstances must first be shown to exist before the issuance of a writ of possession may be deferred. The CA then ruled that the petitioner failed to prove that these equitable circumstances are present in this case, citing for this purpose the ruling in Vaca v. Court of Appeals.[15] Based on the Vaca ruling, the CA ordered the RTC to issue the corresponding writ of possession.
	GR No. 156421 2008-04-14	JOSE FERNADEZ v. SPS. GREGORIO ESPINOZA AND JOJI GADOR-ESPINOZA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Apparently, the appellate court relied on Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court[28] and Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court[29] cited in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[30] in holding that the issuance of writ of possession had ceased to be ministerial. In Cometa, which actually involved execution of judgment for the prevailing party in a damages suit, the subject properties were sold at the public auction at an unusually lower price, while in Barican, the mortgagee bank took five years from the time of foreclosure before filing the petition for the issuance of writ of possession. We have considered these equitable and peculiar circumstances in Cometa and Barican to justify the relaxation of the otherwise absolute rule. None of these exceptional circumstances, however, attended herein so as to place the instant case in the same stature as that of Cometa and Barican. Instead, the ruling in Vaca v. Court of Appeals on all fours with the present petition. In Vaca, there is no dispute that the property was not redeemed within one year from the registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale; thus, the mortgagee bank acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the issuance of the writ of possession. Similarly, UOB, as the purchaser at the auction sale in the instant case, is entitled as a matter of right, to the issuance of the writ of possession.
	GR NO. 165971 2007-09-03	SPS. JEANETTE MALIWAT AND RUFINO MALIWAT v. METROPOLITAN BANK SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In Navarra v. Court of Appeals,[6] we ruled that the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale has a right to the possession of the property even during the one-year period of redemption provided that he files an indemnity bond. After the lapse of said period with no redemption having been made, the right becomes absolute and may be demanded without the posting of a bond. Then in Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[7] we reaffirmed our ruling in Navarra.
	GR NO. 150393 2006-07-31	LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK v. SPS. BARTOLOME AND ZENAIDA ANGELES CORONA, J.
Under RA 3135,[17] after the foreclosure sale or during the redemption period, the purchaser may petition the court to issue him a writ of possession of the foreclosed property. As a rule, once the writ is sought, it becomes ministerial on the court to issue it to the winning bidder.[18] This rule, however, is not absolute.
	GR NO. 138567 2005-03-04	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. SPS. WILFREDO GATAL AND AZUCENA GATAL SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Obviously, the RTC (Branch 47) erred when it granted respondents' motion to dismiss and recalled the writ of possession it earlier issued. Where, as here, the title is consolidated in the name of the mortgagee, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right on the part of the mortgagee, and it is a ministerial duty on the part of the trial court to issue the same. The pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the sale of the mortgaged property cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession. The rule equally applies to separate civil suits questioning the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure and the validity of the public auction sale.[11]
	AM NO. RTJ-03-1750 2005-01-14	MAMERTO MANIQUIZ FOUNDATION v. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is a settled rule that after the consolidation of title in the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession[30] becomes a matter of right. In the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court held:. . . The question raised in this case has already been settled in Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals [184 SCRA 199], in which it was held that the pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the mortgage cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession, because the same is a ministerial act of the trial court after title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee. The ruling was reiterated in Navarra v. Court of Appeals [204 SCRA 850], in which we held that as a rule any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.
	GR No. 140316 2002-08-01	JEFFREY DAYRIT v. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS QUISUMBING, J.
(32) days after such receipt. The appellate court also said that the petition filed in the trial court was not the proper action that the Dayrits could take in order to question the mortgage contract. Citing Vaca vs. Court of Appeals,[6] the appellate court stated that the legality of a mortgage contract cannot be questioned in a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession because the latter is purely a ministerial act of the trial court after title on the property is consolidated in the mortgagee. Hence, this instant petition alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that:I. ...AN EX PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE IS ALLOWED TO OBTAIN POSSESSION OF A PROPERTY FORECLOSED EXTRA-JUDICIALLY AFTER THE PERIOD TO REDEEM THE SAME HAD LAPSED;