This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2006-08-15 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The second requisite that must be complied with by an employer for a valid dismissal is to afford the erring employee due process. The due process requirement is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern since it constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man's innate sense of justice.[39] The Labor Code does not, of course, require a formal or trial type proceeding before an erring employee may be dismissed. This is especially true in the case of a vessel on the ocean or in a foreign port. The minimum requirement of due process in termination proceedings, which must be complied with even with respect to seamen on board a vessel, consists of notice to the employees intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to present their own side of the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the management's decision to terminate.[40] To meet the requirements of due process, the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e., (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.[41] | |||||
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2005-04-08 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Petitioners argue that: (1) following the case of Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. vs. Palmos,[19] prior resort to a motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari or prohibition is not a mandatory rule and may be dispensed with in this case since the issues involved herein are purely legal and have already been passed upon; (2) it is contrary to the policy against judicial delay and multiplicity of suits for a higher court to remand the case to the trial court when the former is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it; (3) the impleaded bank officers are not real parties-in-interest since they are not privy to the contract of deposit between NUI and Metrobank, and they merely complied with the SEC Order authorizing the release of funds from the account of NUI with Metrobank; (4) the "Nicolas faction" has no legal capacity to sue in behalf of NUI not being the de jure board of trustees; and (5) intra-corporate case No. 12-96-5469, lodged before the SEC, must take precedence over the damage suit pending before the trial court.[20] | |||||