This case has been cited 18 times or more.
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2015-04-06 |
BRION, J. |
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| Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action.[21] Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.[22] | |||||
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2011-06-06 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| In support of her prayer for an alias writ of execution against BPI Family and the spouses Go, Muñoz cites our ruling in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, [51] in relation to De la Cruz v. De la Cruz. [52] | |||||
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2011-02-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| As what is involved in this case is a proceeding for the determination of probable cause and an administrative case, necessarily involving different causes of action, the applicable principle is conclusiveness of judgment. The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City[52] explained such, to wit: The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment- states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. | |||||
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2010-07-26 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| The Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City[10] explained the second concept which we reiterate herein, to wit: The second concept -- conclusiveness of judgment -- states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. | |||||
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2010-04-20 |
BRION, J. |
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| Where no identity of causes of action but only identity of issues exists, res judicata comes under the second concept - i.e., under conclusiveness of judgment. Under this concept, the rule bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues involving the same parties even if raised under different claims or causes of action.[40] Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.[41] | |||||
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2008-12-18 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The Barques hinge their claim on a purported subdivision plan, FLS-3168-D, made in favor of Setosta. However, based on the records, it appears that there is a conflict as to its actual existence in the files of the government. Revelatory is the exchange of correspondence between the LMB and the LRA. The LMB did not have any copy of FLS-3168-D in the EDP listing,[50] nor did the LMB have a record of the plan.[51] However, a microfilm copy of FLS-3168-D was on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Capital Region (DENR-NCR).[52] The copy with the Technical Records and Statistical Section, which bore the stamp of the LMB, was denied by the LMB as having emanated from its office.[53] | |||||
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2008-12-10 |
TINGA, J. |
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| First. It is a settled rule that proceedings for judicial reconstitution of certificates of title are proceedings in rem, with the publication of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction.[26] It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.[27] | |||||
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2008-08-06 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[39] provides the following enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. | |||||
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2008-04-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.[12] Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal. | |||||
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2007-06-26 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| Res judicata, according to Black, "refers to the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same demand or cause of action."[41] Res judicata is, in fine, a rule of preclusion to the end that facts or issues settled by final judgment should not be tried anew.[42] It has two aspects: 1) the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action; this is designated as "bar by former judgment"; and 2) precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issues in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. This is the rule on "conclusiveness of judgment."[43] | |||||
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2007-03-28 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Except for the spouses Santiago, BPC recognizes that the intervenors, Nicolas-Agbulos and Abesamis, together with other legitimate homeowners in Parthenon Hills, acquired from BPC titles to their respective subdivided lots in good faith and for value. Even the Republic could not refute that the individuals who acquired lots in Parthenon Hills from BPC were purchasers in good faith and for value. It insists, however, that these buyers could not acquire better titles to the property than its predecessors-in-interest " BPC, Servando, and Antonio " since the spring cannot rise higher than its source. The law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of registered title over the transferee of a vendor bereft of any transmissible rights.[62] | |||||
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2006-09-05 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The doctrine of res judicata is of two aspects. The first aspect is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, damand or cause of action. The second aspect precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties or their successors in interest, on a different claim or cause of action. Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City[6] further explained:The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. | |||||
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2006-07-20 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Private respondent appended to her application the tracing cloth plan of the property under the name of Sotero Bondal. The blue print,[3] dated February 27, 1991, was prepared and signed by Geodetic Engineer Bonifacio C. del Valle and approved by Ernesto L. Llave, Chief, Regional Surveys Division of the Lands Management Service. Per Report[4] of the Land Registration Authority dated September 27, 1994, the property was the subject of an application for registration (Cadastral Case No. 42, GLRO Cadastral Record No. 1324), but "no decision has been rendered thereon, or if there had been any, no copy of the same was furnished to the [Land Registration Authority]." The report also states that the property is covered by Free Patent No. V-13062 dated May 21, 1955.[5] Private respondent had also applied for a free patent over the property, but withdrew her application in a Letter[6] dated October 27, 1994 addressed to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region V, Legaspi City. | |||||
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2006-07-17 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| In their Comment, respondents countered that the actual notice requirement in Section 13 does not apply to LRC Case No. Q-96-8296 because that case was based on Marina's duplicate copy of TCT No. 252708. At any rate, respondents contended that it is the posting and publication of the notice of hearing, not its actual service, which vests jurisdiction to the trial court, citing our ruling in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City.[17] Lastly, respondents maintained that the 28 October 1996 Order is already final and can no longer be set aside. | |||||
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2006-07-17 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Respondents erroneously invoke Calalang as authority for their claim that it is only the publication and posting of the notice of hearing which are mandatory. The question of whether the actual notice requirement in Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of RA 26 is mandatory and jurisdictional was not the main issue in that case - it was whether the petitioners were bound by our ruling in De la Cruz v. De la Cruz,[35] affirming the validity of a Torrens certificate of title issued to one who had obtained the property covered by the title through a conveyance duly recorded in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and who had the title subsequently reconstituted. We answered in the affirmative and dismissed the petitions principally on the ground of res judicata.[36] Notably, we found in Calalang that the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners did not own the disputed property, thus the latter could not claim any better right than the former. | |||||
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2005-03-31 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The doctrine of res judicata precludes the re-litigation of a particular fact or issue already passed upon by a court of competent jurisdiction in a former judgment, in another action between the same parties based on a different claim or cause of action. The judgment in the prior action operates as estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or judgment was rendered.[7] If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.[8] | |||||
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2005-02-17 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale.[17] This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly covered by the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.[18] | |||||
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2004-05-18 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| [A] fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.[30] (Citations omitted, underscoring supplied.) | |||||