This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2012-03-14 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| We concur with the trial and appellate courts in rejecting appellants' defenses of denial and alibi. Time and again this Court has ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to prove; it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses.[9] Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed.[10] Such physical impossibility was not shown to have existed in this case where appellants' testimonies confirmed they were in the same locality (Bagong Silang) when the robbery-killing took place. | |||||
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2005-07-21 |
PER CURIAM |
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| [14] People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, February 8, 1994, 229 SCRA 754. | |||||
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2004-06-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Appellants' defense of denial and alibi must likewise fail. As between their mere denial and their positive identification by the prosecution witnesses, the trial court did not err in according weight to the latter. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was in another place at such a period of time and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission.[57] These requirements of time and place must be strictly met.[58] Appellants failed to establish that it was physically impossible for them to be at Arlegui Bridge, Quiapo, Manila on May 3, 2000 at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. What is clear from the evidence is that they were at Elizondo Street, Quiapo, Manila, a stone's throw away from Arlegui. It bears emphasis that their testimonies as to their whereabouts during their arrest were inconsistent. Appellant Bandang narrated during her direct testimony that she and appellant Abubakar were in a sidewalk store in Elizondo Street, Quiapo, Manila when they were suddenly accosted by the police officers. On cross-examination, she contradicted herself and claimed that she and appellant Abubakar were arrested inside their house.[59] For her part, appellant Salamat stated that the police forcibly dragged her and her daughter, appellant Bandang, inside a vehicle and it was only then that she saw appellant Abubakar.[60] Meanwhile, both appellants Salamat and Abubakar were silent on appellant Bandang's claim that the apprehending policemen demanded hush money from them. Undoubtedly, the inconsistencies in appellants' testimonies weaken their defense. They reveal concocted stories and a web of lies. | |||||
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2004-02-03 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Appellants proffered the defense of denial and alibi. As between their mere denial and the positive identification and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we are convinced that the trial court did not err in according weight to the latter. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was in another place at such a period of time that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission.[116] These requirements of time and place must be strictly met.[117] A thorough examination of the evidence for the defense shows that the appellants failed to meet these settled requirements. They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997. | |||||
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2002-09-05 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| her testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.[21] Moreover, considering that the private complainant was only aged 15, quite innocent in the ways of the world and with unblemished reputation, we have no hesitation in conceding that she brought her complaint and testified against appellant for the sole purpose of seeking justice, i.e., of righting a wrong done to her person and honor. Although Maylin initially vacillated in identifying her aggressor, her vacillation was sufficiently explained. Appellant had threatened to kill her and all those to whom she would tell of her misfortune. Complainant was only fifteen years old at the time of the rape. She was | |||||