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NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION v. JUDGE SALVADOR DE GUZMAN

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 195654 2015-11-25	REYNALDO INUTAN v. NAPAR CONTRACTING DEL CASTILLO, J.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] assails the August 27, 2010 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106724, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Reynaldo Inutan (Inutan), Helen Carte (Carte), Noel Ayson (Ayson), Ivy Cabarle (Cabarle), Noel Jamili (Jamili), Maritess Hular (Hular), Rolito Azucena (Azucena), Raymundo Tunog (Tunog), Jenelyn Sancho, Wilmar Bolonias, Roger Bernal (Bernal), Agustin Estre (Estre), Marilou Sagun (Sagun), and Enrique Ledesma, Jr. (Ledesma), against respondents Napar Contracting & Allied Services (Napar), Norman Lacsamana (Lacsamana), Jonas International, Inc. (Jonas), and Philip Young (Young), and affirmed the June 26, 2008 Decision[4] and October 14, 2008 Resolution[5] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 041474-04 dismissing the consolidated complaints against respondents for illegal dismissal with money claims on the ground of res judicata. Likewise assailed is the CA's February 10, 2011 Resolution[6] which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
	GR No. 206666 2015-01-21	ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMELEC LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
In contrast, the ruling of the Court in Casido[96] and Patriarca,[97] which both cited Barrioquinto,[98] all related to amnesty and not to pardon. The paragraph in Casido and Patriarca that J. Leonen quoted to contradict the Monsanto inclusion is part of the Court's attempt in Casido and Patriarca to distinguish amnesty from pardon.
	GR No. 189698 2010-02-22	ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS PUNO, C.J.
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction.[34] What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.[35] The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,[36] which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
	GR No. 176951 2009-12-21	LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC VELASCO JR., J.
Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature.[43] In fact, any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.[44] Torres v. Limjap could not have been more precise: The intent of a Statute is the Law. - If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is x x x the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature x x x.[45] (Emphasis supplied.)
	GR No. 189698 2009-12-01	ELEAZAR P. QUINTO v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
The test for a valid classification is reasonableness,[107] which criterion is complied with upon a showing of the following: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
	GR No. 176951 2008-11-18	LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Legislative intent or spirit is the controlling factor, the leading star and guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute.[112] If a statute needs construction, the influence most dominant in that process is the intent or spirit of the act.[113] The spirit, rather than the letter, of a statute, determines its construction.[114] Thus, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent.[115] For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.[116] Stated otherwise, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.[117] Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law. It is the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In fact, any interpretation that runs counter with the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.[118] Torres v. Limjap[119] could not have been more precise, to wit:The intent of a Statute is the Law. - If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature x x x.[120] (Emphasis supplied) Verba intentioni, non e contra debent inservire. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent than intent to the words. Ang mga salita ng batas ay dapat higit na sumunod sa layunin kaysa ang layunin ang sumunod sa mga salita nito.