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ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ v. HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU

This case has been cited 9 times or more.

	GR No. 182601 2014-11-10	JOEY M. PESTILOS v. MORENO GENEROSO BRION, J.
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.[91] Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.[92]
	GR No. 169042 2011-10-05	ERDITO QUARTO v. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON MARCELO BRION, J.
As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that he moved for a reconsideration of the assailed resolutions based substantially on the same grounds stated in this present petition.[32] Neither did the petitioner file a motion for the inclusion of the respondents in the informations before filing the present petition.[33] These are adequate remedies that the petitioner chose to forego; he bypassed these remedies and proceeded to seek recourse through the present petition.[34]
	GR Nos. 174813-15 2009-03-17	NILO HIPOS v. RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor General, is contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou[7]:The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion.
	GR No. 170723 2008-03-03	GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE v. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court's general policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case.[62] The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.[63] The possible exception to this rule is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But that is not the case herein.
	GR NO. 170470 2006-09-26	PEOPLE v. EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence. We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation - when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect.[41] Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning.[42]
	GR No. 161629 2005-07-29	ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
We note that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.[23] By stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends' the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.
	GR NO. 152398 2005-04-14	EDGAR CRISOSTOMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN CARPIO, J.
Crisostomo argues that the Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to try the case. Crisostomo points out that the crime of murder is not listed in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 ("PD 1606") as one of the crimes that the Sandiganbayan can try. Crisostomo faults the Sandiganbayan for not applying the ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou[6] to this case. In Sanchez v. Demetriou, the Court ruled that public office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute before the Sandiganbayan could acquire jurisdiction over a case. Crisostomo insists that there is no direct relation between the commission of murder and Crisostomo's public office. Crisostomo further contends that the mere allegation in the Information that the offense was committed in relation to Crisostomo's office is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan. Such allegation without the specific factual averments is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of Crisostomo's official duties.
	GR No. 159747 2004-04-13	SAN II v. PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF DOJ AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,[7] that while it may be true that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas,[8] this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."
	GR Nos. 147814-15 2003-09-16	RAUL ZAPATOS Y LEGASPI v. PEOPLE SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In a catena of cases decided under the aegis of P.D. No. 1606, such as Aguinaldo vs. Domagas,[58] Sanchez vs. Demetriou,[59] Natividad vs. Felix,[60] and Republic vs. Asuncion,[61] we ruled that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: (1) the offense committed by the public officer must be in relation to his office; and (2) the penalty prescribed must be higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. Obviously, the first requirement is the present cause of discord between petitioner and the People.